RFC 9640 | YANG Data Types and Groupings for Crypto | August 2024 |
Watsen | Standards Track | [Page] |
This document presents a YANG 1.1 (RFC 7950) module defining identities, typedefs, and groupings useful to cryptographic applications.¶
This is an Internet Standards Track document.¶
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.¶
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9640.¶
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
This document presents a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module defining identities, typedefs, and groupings useful to cryptographic applications.¶
This document presents a YANG module [RFC7950] that is part of a collection of RFCs that work together to, ultimately, support the configuration of both the clients and servers of both the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040].¶
The dependency relationship between the primary YANG groupings defined in the various RFCs is presented in the below diagram. In some cases, a document may define secondary groupings that introduce dependencies not illustrated in the diagram. The labels in the diagram are shorthand names for the defining RFCs. The citation references for the shorthand names are provided below the diagram.¶
Please note that the arrows in the diagram point from referencer to referenced. For example, the "crypto-types" RFC does not have any dependencies, whilst the "keystore" RFC depends on the "crypto-types" RFC.¶
crypto-types ^ ^ / \ / \ truststore keystore ^ ^ ^ ^ | +---------+ | | | | | | | +------------+ | tcp-client-server | / | | ^ ^ ssh-client-server | | | | ^ tls-client-server | | | ^ ^ http-client-server | | | | | ^ | | | +-----+ +---------+ | | | | | | | | +-----------|--------|--------------+ | | | | | | | | +-----------+ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | netconf-client-server restconf-client-server¶
Label in Diagram | Reference |
---|---|
crypto-types | RFC 9640 |
truststore | [RFC9641] |
keystore | [RFC9642] |
tcp-client-server | [RFC9643] |
ssh-client-server | [RFC9644] |
tls-client-server | [RFC9645] |
http-client-server | [HTTP-CLIENT-SERVER] |
netconf-client-server | [NETCONF-CLIENT-SERVER] |
restconf-client-server | [RESTCONF-CLIENT-SERVER] |
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This document is compliant with the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. It does not define any protocol-accessible nodes that are "config false".¶
Various examples in this document use "BASE64VALUE=" as a placeholder value for binary data that has been base64 encoded (per Section 9.8 of [RFC7950]). This placeholder value is used because real base64-encoded structures are often many lines long and hence distracting to the example being presented.¶
This section defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module called "ietf-crypto-types". A high-level overview of the module is provided in Section 2.1. Examples illustrating the module's use are provided in Section 2.2. The YANG module itself is defined in Section 2.3.¶
This section provides an overview of the "ietf-crypto-types" module in terms of its features, identities, typedefs, and groupings.¶
The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in the "ietf-crypto-types" module:¶
Features: +-- one-symmetric-key-format +-- one-asymmetric-key-format +-- symmetrically-encrypted-value-format +-- asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format +-- cms-enveloped-data-format +-- cms-encrypted-data-format +-- p10-csr-format +-- csr-generation +-- certificate-expiration-notification +-- cleartext-passwords +-- encrypted-passwords +-- cleartext-symmetric-keys +-- hidden-symmetric-keys +-- encrypted-symmetric-keys +-- cleartext-private-keys +-- hidden-private-keys +-- encrypted-private-keys¶
The diagram above uses syntax that is similar to but not the same as that in [RFC8340].¶
The following diagram illustrates the hierarchical relationship amongst the "identity" statements defined in the "ietf-crypto-types" module:¶
Identities: +-- public-key-format | +-- subject-public-key-info-format | +-- ssh-public-key-format +-- private-key-format | +-- rsa-private-key-format | +-- ec-private-key-format | +-- one-asymmetric-key-format | {one-asymmetric-key-format}? +-- symmetric-key-format | +-- octet-string-key-format | +-- one-symmetric-key-format | {one-symmetric-key-format}? +-- encrypted-value-format | +-- symmetrically-encrypted-value-format | | | {symmetrically-encrypted-value-format}? | | +-- cms-encrypted-data-format | | {cms-encrypted-data-format}? | +-- asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format | | {asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format}? | +-- cms-enveloped-data-format | {cms-enveloped-data-format}? +-- csr-format +-- p10-csr-format {p10-csr-format?}¶
The diagram above uses syntax that is similar to but not the same as that in [RFC8340].¶
Comments:¶
The following diagram illustrates the relationship amongst the "typedef" statements defined in the "ietf-crypto-types" module:¶
Typedefs: binary +-- csr-info +-- csr +-- x509 | +-- trust-anchor-cert-x509 | +-- end-entity-cert-x509 +-- crl +-- ocsp-request +-- ocsp-response +-- cms +-- data-content-cms +-- signed-data-cms | +-- trust-anchor-cert-cms | +-- end-entity-cert-cms +-- enveloped-data-cms +-- digested-data-cms +-- encrypted-data-cms +-- authenticated-data-cms¶
The diagram above uses syntax that is similar to but not the same as that in [RFC8340].¶
Comments:¶
The "ietf-crypto-types" module defines the following "grouping" statements:¶
Each of these groupings are presented in the following subsections.¶
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "encrypted-value-grouping" grouping:¶
grouping encrypted-value-grouping: +-- encrypted-by +-- encrypted-value-format identityref +-- encrypted-value binary¶
Comments:¶
The "encrypted-value" node is the value encrypted by the key referenced by the "encrypted-by" node and encoded in the format appropriate for the kind of key it was encrypted by.¶
See Section 2.1.2 for information about the "format" identities.¶
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the "password-grouping" grouping. This tree diagram does not expand the internally used "grouping" statement(s):¶
grouping password-grouping: +-- (password-type) +--:(cleartext-password) {cleartext-passwords}? | +-- cleartext-password? string +--:(encrypted-password) {encrypted-passwords}? +-- encrypted-password +---u encrypted-value-grouping¶
Comments:¶
For the referenced "grouping" statement(s):¶
The "choice" statement enables the password data to be cleartext or encrypted, as follows:¶
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the "symmetric-key-grouping" grouping. This tree diagram does not expand the internally used "grouping" statement(s):¶
grouping symmetric-key-grouping: +-- key-format? identityref +-- (key-type) +--:(cleartext-symmetric-key) | +-- cleartext-symmetric-key? binary | {cleartext-symmetric-keys}? +--:(hidden-symmetric-key) {hidden-symmetric-keys}? | +-- hidden-symmetric-key? empty +--:(encrypted-symmetric-key) {encrypted-symmetric-keys}? +-- encrypted-symmetric-key +---u encrypted-value-grouping¶
Comments:¶
For the referenced "grouping" statement(s):¶
The "choice" statement enables the private key data to be cleartext, encrypted, or hidden, as follows:¶
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the "public-key-grouping" grouping. This tree diagram does not expand any internally used "grouping" statement(s):¶
grouping public-key-grouping: +-- public-key-format identityref +-- public-key binary¶
Comments:¶
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the "private-key-grouping" grouping. This tree diagram does not expand the internally used "grouping" statement(s):¶
grouping private-key-grouping: +-- private-key-format? identityref +-- (private-key-type) +--:(cleartext-private-key) {cleartext-private-keys}? | +-- cleartext-private-key? binary +--:(hidden-private-key) {hidden-private-keys}? | +-- hidden-private-key? empty +--:(encrypted-private-key) {encrypted-private-keys}? +-- encrypted-private-key +---u encrypted-value-grouping¶
Comments:¶
For the referenced "grouping" statement(s):¶
The "choice" statement enables the private key data to be cleartext, encrypted, or hidden, as follows:¶
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping. This tree diagram does not expand the internally used "grouping" statement(s):¶
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-grouping: +---u public-key-grouping +---u private-key-grouping¶
Comments:¶
For the referenced "grouping" statement(s):¶
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the "certificate-expiration-grouping" grouping:¶
grouping certificate-expiration-grouping: +---n certificate-expiration {certificate-expiration-notification}? +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time¶
Comments:¶
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the "trust-anchor-cert-grouping" grouping. This tree diagram does not expand the internally used "grouping" statement(s):¶
grouping trust-anchor-cert-grouping: +-- cert-data? trust-anchor-cert-cms +---u certificate-expiration-grouping¶
Comments:¶
For the referenced "grouping" statement(s):¶
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the "end-entity-cert-grouping" grouping. This tree diagram does not expand the internally used "grouping" statement(s):¶
grouping end-entity-cert-grouping: +-- cert-data? end-entity-cert-cms +---u certificate-expiration-grouping¶
Comments:¶
For the referenced "grouping" statement(s):¶
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the "generate-csr-grouping" grouping:¶
grouping generate-csr-grouping: +---x generate-csr {csr-generation}? +---w input | +---w csr-format identityref | +---w csr-info csr-info +--ro output +--ro (csr-type) +--:(p10-csr) +--ro p10-csr? p10-csr¶
Comments:¶
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the "asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping" grouping. This tree diagram does not expand the internally used "grouping" statement(s):¶
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping: +---u asymmetric-key-pair-grouping +---u end-entity-cert-grouping +---u generate-csr-grouping¶
Comments:¶
For the referenced "grouping" statement(s):¶
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping. This tree diagram does not expand the internally used "grouping" statement(s):¶
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping: +---u asymmetric-key-pair-grouping +-- certificates | +-- certificate* [name] | +-- name string | +---u end-entity-cert-grouping +---u generate-csr-grouping¶
Comments:¶
For the referenced "grouping" statement(s):¶
The "ietf-crypto-types" module does not contain any protocol-accessible nodes, but the module needs to be "implemented", as described in Section 5.6.5 of [RFC7950], in order for the identities in Section 2.1.2 to be defined.¶
The following non-normative module is constructed in order to illustrate the use of the "symmetric-key-grouping" (Section 2.1.4.3), the "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" (Section 2.1.4.12), and the "password-grouping" (Section 2.1.4.2) "grouping" statements.¶
Notably, this example module and associated configuration data illustrates that a hidden private key (ex-hidden-asymmetric-key) has been used to encrypt a symmetric key (ex-encrypted-one-symmetric-based-symmetric-key) that has been used to encrypt another private key (ex-encrypted-rsa-based-asymmetric-key). Additionally, the symmetric key is also used to encrypt a password (ex-encrypted-password).¶
module ex-crypto-types-usage { yang-version 1.1; namespace "https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage"; prefix ectu; import ietf-crypto-types { prefix ct; reference "RFC 9640: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography"; } organization "Example Corporation"; contact "YANG Designer <mailto:yang.designer@example.com>"; description "This example module illustrates the 'symmetric-key-grouping' and 'asymmetric-key-grouping' groupings defined in the 'ietf-crypto-types' module defined in RFC 9640."; revision 2024-03-16 { description "Initial version."; reference "RFC 9640: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography"; } container symmetric-keys { description "A container of symmetric keys."; list symmetric-key { key "name"; description "A symmetric key."; leaf name { type string; description "An arbitrary name for this key."; } uses ct:symmetric-key-grouping { augment "key-type/encrypted-symmetric-key/" + "encrypted-symmetric-key/encrypted-by" { description "Augments in a 'choice' statement enabling the encrypting key to be any other symmetric or asymmetric key."; uses encrypted-by-grouping; } } } } container asymmetric-keys { description "A container of asymmetric keys."; list asymmetric-key { key "name"; leaf name { type string; description "An arbitrary name for this key."; } uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping { augment "private-key-type/encrypted-private-key/" + "encrypted-private-key/encrypted-by" { description "Augments in a 'choice' statement enabling the encrypting key to be any other symmetric or asymmetric key."; uses encrypted-by-grouping; } } description "An asymmetric key pair with associated certificates."; } } container passwords { description "A container of passwords."; list password { key "name"; leaf name { type string; description "An arbitrary name for this password."; } uses ct:password-grouping { augment "password-type/encrypted-password/" + "encrypted-password/encrypted-by" { description "Augments in a 'choice' statement enabling the encrypting key to be any symmetric or asymmetric key."; uses encrypted-by-grouping; } } description "A password."; } } grouping encrypted-by-grouping { description "A grouping that defines a choice enabling references to other keys."; choice encrypted-by { mandatory true; description "A choice amongst other symmetric or asymmetric keys."; case symmetric-key-ref { leaf symmetric-key-ref { type leafref { path "/ectu:symmetric-keys/ectu:symmetric-key/" + "ectu:name"; } description "Identifies the symmetric key that encrypts this key."; } } case asymmetric-key-ref { leaf asymmetric-key-ref { type leafref { path "/ectu:asymmetric-keys/ectu:asymmetric-key/" + "ectu:name"; } description "Identifies the asymmetric key that encrypts this key."; } } } } }¶
The tree diagram [RFC8340] for this example module is as follows:¶
module: ex-crypto-types-usage +--rw symmetric-keys | +--rw symmetric-key* [name] | +--rw name string | +--rw key-format? identityref | +--rw (key-type) | +--:(cleartext-symmetric-key) | | +--rw cleartext-symmetric-key? binary | | {cleartext-symmetric-keys}? | +--:(hidden-symmetric-key) {hidden-symmetric-keys}? | | +--rw hidden-symmetric-key? empty | +--:(encrypted-symmetric-key) {encrypted-symmetric-keys}? | +--rw encrypted-symmetric-key | +--rw encrypted-by | | +--rw (encrypted-by) | | +--:(symmetric-key-ref) | | | +--rw symmetric-key-ref? leafref | | +--:(asymmetric-key-ref) | | +--rw asymmetric-key-ref? leafref | +--rw encrypted-value-format identityref | +--rw encrypted-value binary +--rw asymmetric-keys | +--rw asymmetric-key* [name] | +--rw name string | +--rw public-key-format? identityref | +--rw public-key? binary | +--rw private-key-format? identityref | +--rw (private-key-type) | | +--:(cleartext-private-key) {cleartext-private-keys}? | | | +--rw cleartext-private-key? binary | | +--:(hidden-private-key) {hidden-private-keys}? | | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty | | +--:(encrypted-private-key) {encrypted-private-keys}? | | +--rw encrypted-private-key | | +--rw encrypted-by | | | +--rw (encrypted-by) | | | +--:(symmetric-key-ref) | | | | +--rw symmetric-key-ref? leafref | | | +--:(asymmetric-key-ref) | | | +--rw asymmetric-key-ref? leafref | | +--rw encrypted-value-format identityref | | +--rw encrypted-value binary | +--rw certificates | | +--rw certificate* [name] | | +--rw name string | | +--rw cert-data end-entity-cert-cms | | +---n certificate-expiration | | {certificate-expiration-notification}? | | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time | +---x generate-csr {csr-generation}? | +---w input | | +---w csr-format identityref | | +---w csr-info csr-info | +--ro output | +--ro (csr-type) | +--:(p10-csr) | +--ro p10-csr? p10-csr +--rw passwords +--rw password* [name] +--rw name string +--rw (password-type) +--:(cleartext-password) {cleartext-passwords}? | +--rw cleartext-password? string +--:(encrypted-password) {encrypted-passwords}? +--rw encrypted-password +--rw encrypted-by | +--rw (encrypted-by) | +--:(symmetric-key-ref) | | +--rw symmetric-key-ref? leafref | +--:(asymmetric-key-ref) | +--rw asymmetric-key-ref? leafref +--rw encrypted-value-format identityref +--rw encrypted-value binary¶
Finally, the following example illustrates various symmetric and asymmetric keys as they might appear in configuration:¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ <symmetric-keys xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage" xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"> <symmetric-key> <name>ex-hidden-symmetric-key</name> <hidden-symmetric-key/> </symmetric-key> <symmetric-key> <name>ex-octet-string-based-symmetric-key</name> <key-format>ct:octet-string-key-format</key-format> <cleartext-symmetric-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-symmetric-key> </symmetric-key> <symmetric-key> <name>ex-one-symmetric-based-symmetric-key</name> <key-format>ct:one-symmetric-key-format</key-format> <cleartext-symmetric-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-symmetric-key> </symmetric-key> <symmetric-key> <name>ex-encrypted-one-symmetric-based-symmetric-key</name> <key-format>ct:one-symmetric-key-format</key-format> <encrypted-symmetric-key> <encrypted-by> <asymmetric-key-ref>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key</asymmetric-key\ -ref> </encrypted-by> <encrypted-value-format>ct:cms-enveloped-data-format</encrypte\ d-value-format> <encrypted-value>BASE64VALUE=</encrypted-value> </encrypted-symmetric-key> </symmetric-key> </symmetric-keys> <asymmetric-keys xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage" xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"> <asymmetric-key> <name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key</name> <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-key\ -format> <public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key> <hidden-private-key/> <certificates> <certificate> <name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key-cert</name> <cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data> </certificate> </certificates> </asymmetric-key> <asymmetric-key> <name>ex-rsa-based-asymmetric-key</name> <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-key\ -format> <public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key> <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-forma\ t> <cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key> <certificates> <certificate> <name>ex-cert</name> <cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data> </certificate> </certificates> </asymmetric-key> <asymmetric-key> <name>ex-one-asymmetric-based-asymmetric-key</name> <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-key\ -format> <public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key> <private-key-format>ct:one-asymmetric-key-format</private-key-fo\ rmat> <cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key> </asymmetric-key> <asymmetric-key> <name>ex-encrypted-rsa-based-asymmetric-key</name> <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-key\ -format> <public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key> <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-forma\ t> <encrypted-private-key> <encrypted-by> <symmetric-key-ref>ex-encrypted-one-symmetric-based-symmetri\ c-key</symmetric-key-ref> </encrypted-by> <encrypted-value-format>ct:cms-encrypted-data-format</encrypte\ d-value-format> <encrypted-value>BASE64VALUE=</encrypted-value> </encrypted-private-key> </asymmetric-key> </asymmetric-keys> <passwords xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage" xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"> <password> <name>ex-cleartext-password</name> <cleartext-password>super-secret</cleartext-password> </password> <password> <name>ex-encrypted-password</name> <encrypted-password> <encrypted-by> <symmetric-key-ref>ex-encrypted-one-symmetric-based-symmetri\ c-key</symmetric-key-ref> </encrypted-by> <encrypted-value-format>ct:cms-encrypted-data-format</encrypte\ d-value-format> <encrypted-value>BASE64VALUE=</encrypted-value> </encrypted-password> </password> </passwords>¶
The following example illustrates the "generate-certificate-signing-request" action, discussed in Section 2.1.4.10, with the NETCONF protocol.¶
REQUEST¶
<rpc message-id="101" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0" xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"> <action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1"> <asymmetric-keys xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage"> <asymmetric-key> <name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key</name> <generate-csr> <csr-format>ct:p10-csr-format</csr-format> <csr-info>BASE64VALUE=</csr-info> </generate-csr> </asymmetric-key> </asymmetric-keys> </action> </rpc>¶
RESPONSE¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ <rpc-reply message-id="101" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"> <p10-csr xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage"\ >BASE64VALUE=</p10-csr> </rpc-reply>¶
The following example illustrates the "certificate-expiration" notification, discussed in Section 2.1.4.7, with the NETCONF protocol.¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ <notification xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:notification:1.0"> <eventTime>2018-05-25T00:01:00Z</eventTime> <asymmetric-keys xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-type\ s-usage"> <asymmetric-key> <name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key</name> <certificates> <certificate> <name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key-cert</name> <certificate-expiration> <expiration-date>2018-08-05T14:18:53-05:00</expiration-d\ ate> </certificate-expiration> </certificate> </certificates> </asymmetric-key> </asymmetric-keys> </notification>¶
This module has normative references to [RFC2119], [RFC2986], [RFC4253], [RFC5280], [RFC5652], [RFC5915], [RFC5958], [RFC6031], [RFC6960], [RFC6991], [RFC7093], [RFC8017], [RFC8174], [RFC8341], and [ITU.X690.2021].¶
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-crypto-types@2024-03-16.yang" module ietf-crypto-types { yang-version 1.1; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"; prefix ct; import ietf-yang-types { prefix yang; reference "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types"; } import ietf-netconf-acm { prefix nacm; reference "RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model"; } organization "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group"; contact "WG Web: https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf WG List: NETCONF WG list <mailto:netconf@ietf.org> Author: Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>"; description "This module defines common YANG types for cryptographic applications. The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors of the code. All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9640 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9640); see the RFC itself for full legal notices."; revision 2024-03-16 { description "Initial version."; reference "RFC 9640: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography"; } /****************/ /* Features */ /****************/ feature one-symmetric-key-format { description "Indicates that the server supports the 'one-symmetric-key-format' identity."; } feature one-asymmetric-key-format { description "Indicates that the server supports the 'one-asymmetric-key-format' identity."; } feature symmetrically-encrypted-value-format { description "Indicates that the server supports the 'symmetrically-encrypted-value-format' identity."; } feature asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format { description "Indicates that the server supports the 'asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format' identity."; } feature cms-enveloped-data-format { description "Indicates that the server supports the 'cms-enveloped-data-format' identity."; } feature cms-encrypted-data-format { description "Indicates that the server supports the 'cms-encrypted-data-format' identity."; } feature p10-csr-format { description "Indicates that the server implements support for generating P10-based CSRs, as defined in RFC 2986."; reference "RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7"; } feature csr-generation { description "Indicates that the server implements the 'generate-csr' action."; } feature certificate-expiration-notification { description "Indicates that the server implements the 'certificate-expiration' notification."; } feature cleartext-passwords { description "Indicates that the server supports cleartext passwords."; } feature encrypted-passwords { description "Indicates that the server supports password encryption."; } feature cleartext-symmetric-keys { description "Indicates that the server supports cleartext symmetric keys."; } feature hidden-symmetric-keys { description "Indicates that the server supports hidden keys."; } feature encrypted-symmetric-keys { description "Indicates that the server supports encryption of symmetric keys."; } feature cleartext-private-keys { description "Indicates that the server supports cleartext private keys."; } feature hidden-private-keys { description "Indicates that the server supports hidden keys."; } feature encrypted-private-keys { description "Indicates that the server supports encryption of private keys."; } /*************************************************/ /* Base Identities for Key Format Structures */ /*************************************************/ identity symmetric-key-format { description "Base key-format identity for symmetric keys."; } identity public-key-format { description "Base key-format identity for public keys."; } identity private-key-format { description "Base key-format identity for private keys."; } /****************************************************/ /* Identities for Private Key Format Structures */ /****************************************************/ identity rsa-private-key-format { base private-key-format; description "Indicates that the private key value is encoded as an RSAPrivateKey (from RFC 8017), encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."; reference "RFC 8017: PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2 ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021"; } identity ec-private-key-format { base private-key-format; description "Indicates that the private key value is encoded as an ECPrivateKey (from RFC 5915), encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."; reference "RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021"; } identity one-asymmetric-key-format { if-feature "one-asymmetric-key-format"; base private-key-format; description "Indicates that the private key value is a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) OneAsymmetricKey structure, as defined in RFC 5958, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."; reference "RFC 5958: Asymmetric Key Packages ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021"; } /***************************************************/ /* Identities for Public Key Format Structures */ /***************************************************/ identity ssh-public-key-format { base public-key-format; description "Indicates that the public key value is a Secure Shell (SSH) public key, as specified in RFC 4253, Section 6.6, i.e.: string certificate or public key format identifier byte[n] key/certificate data."; reference "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"; } identity subject-public-key-info-format { base public-key-format; description "Indicates that the public key value is a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure, as described in RFC 5280, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."; reference "RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021"; } /******************************************************/ /* Identities for Symmetric Key Format Structures */ /******************************************************/ identity octet-string-key-format { base symmetric-key-format; description "Indicates that the key is encoded as a raw octet string. The length of the octet string MUST be appropriate for the associated algorithm's block size. The identity of the associated algorithm is outside the scope of this specification. This is also true when the octet string has been encrypted."; } identity one-symmetric-key-format { if-feature "one-symmetric-key-format"; base symmetric-key-format; description "Indicates that the private key value is a CMS OneSymmetricKey structure, as defined in RFC 6031, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."; reference "RFC 6031: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Symmetric Key Package Content Type ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021"; } /*************************************************/ /* Identities for Encrypted Value Structures */ /*************************************************/ identity encrypted-value-format { description "Base format identity for encrypted values."; } identity symmetrically-encrypted-value-format { if-feature "symmetrically-encrypted-value-format"; base encrypted-value-format; description "Base format identity for symmetrically encrypted values."; } identity asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format { if-feature "asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format"; base encrypted-value-format; description "Base format identity for asymmetrically encrypted values."; } identity cms-encrypted-data-format { if-feature "cms-encrypted-data-format"; base symmetrically-encrypted-value-format; description "Indicates that the encrypted value conforms to the 'encrypted-data-cms' type with the constraint that the 'unprotectedAttrs' value is not set."; reference "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021"; } identity cms-enveloped-data-format { if-feature "cms-enveloped-data-format"; base asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format; description "Indicates that the encrypted value conforms to the 'enveloped-data-cms' type with the following constraints: The EnvelopedData structure MUST have exactly one 'RecipientInfo'. If the asymmetric key supports public key cryptography (e.g., RSA), then the 'RecipientInfo' must be a 'KeyTransRecipientInfo' with the 'RecipientIdentifier' using a 'subjectKeyIdentifier' with the value set using 'method 1' in RFC 7093 over the recipient's public key. Otherwise, if the asymmetric key supports key agreement (e.g., Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)), then the 'RecipientInfo' must be a 'KeyAgreeRecipientInfo'. The 'OriginatorIdentifierOrKey' value must use the 'OriginatorPublicKey' alternative. The 'UserKeyingMaterial' value must not be present. There must be exactly one 'RecipientEncryptedKeys' value having the 'KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier' set to 'rKeyId' with the value set using 'method 1' in RFC 7093 over the recipient's public key."; reference "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) RFC 7093: Additional Methods for Generating Key Identifiers Values ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021"; } /*********************************************************/ /* Identities for Certificate Signing Request Formats */ /*********************************************************/ identity csr-format { description "A base identity for the certificate signing request formats. Additional derived identities MAY be defined by future efforts."; } identity p10-csr-format { if-feature "p10-csr-format"; base csr-format; description "Indicates the CertificationRequest structure defined in RFC 2986."; reference "RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7"; } /***************************************************/ /* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from RFC 2986 */ /***************************************************/ typedef csr-info { type binary; description "A CertificationRequestInfo structure, as defined in RFC 2986, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."; reference "RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7 ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021"; } typedef p10-csr { type binary; description "A CertificationRequest structure, as specified in RFC 2986, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."; reference "RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7 ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021"; } /***************************************************/ /* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from RFC 5280 */ /***************************************************/ typedef x509 { type binary; description "A Certificate structure, as specified in RFC 5280, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."; reference "RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021"; } typedef crl { type binary; description "A CertificateList structure, as specified in RFC 5280, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."; reference "RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021"; } /***************************************************/ /* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from RFC 6960 */ /***************************************************/ typedef oscp-request { type binary; description "A OCSPRequest structure, as specified in RFC 6960, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."; reference "RFC 6960: X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021"; } typedef oscp-response { type binary; description "A OCSPResponse structure, as specified in RFC 6960, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."; reference "RFC 6960: X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021"; } /***********************************************/ /* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from 5652 */ /***********************************************/ typedef cms { type binary; description "A ContentInfo structure, as specified in RFC 5652, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."; reference "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021"; } typedef data-content-cms { type cms; description "A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the data content type, as described in Section 4 of RFC 5652."; reference "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)"; } typedef signed-data-cms { type cms; description "A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the signed-data content type, as described in Section 5 of RFC 5652."; reference "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)"; } typedef enveloped-data-cms { type cms; description "A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the enveloped-data content type, as described in Section 6 of RFC 5652."; reference "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)"; } typedef digested-data-cms { type cms; description "A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the digested-data content type, as described in Section 7 of RFC 5652."; reference "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)"; } typedef encrypted-data-cms { type cms; description "A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the encrypted-data content type, as described in Section 8 of RFC 5652."; reference "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)"; } typedef authenticated-data-cms { type cms; description "A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the authenticated-data content type, as described in Section 9 of RFC 5652."; reference "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)"; } /*********************************************************/ /* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures related to RFC 5280 */ /*********************************************************/ typedef trust-anchor-cert-x509 { type x509; description "A Certificate structure that MUST encode a self-signed root certificate."; } typedef end-entity-cert-x509 { type x509; description "A Certificate structure that MUST encode a certificate that is neither self-signed nor has Basic constraint CA true."; } /*********************************************************/ /* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures related to RFC 5652 */ /*********************************************************/ typedef trust-anchor-cert-cms { type signed-data-cms; description "A CMS SignedData structure that MUST contain the chain of X.509 certificates needed to authenticate the certificate presented by a client or end entity. The CMS MUST contain only a single chain of certificates. The client or end-entity certificate MUST only authenticate to the last intermediate CA certificate listed in the chain. In all cases, the chain MUST include a self-signed root certificate. In the case where the root certificate is itself the issuer of the client or end-entity certificate, only one certificate is present. This CMS structure MAY (as applicable where this type is used) also contain suitably fresh (as defined by local policy) revocation objects with which the device can verify the revocation status of the certificates. This CMS encodes the degenerate form of the SignedData structure (RFC 5652, Section 5.2) that is commonly used to disseminate X.509 certificates and revocation objects (RFC 5280)."; reference "RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)"; } typedef end-entity-cert-cms { type signed-data-cms; description "A CMS SignedData structure that MUST contain the end-entity certificate itself and MAY contain any number of intermediate certificates leading up to a trust anchor certificate. The trust anchor certificate MAY be included as well. The CMS MUST contain a single end-entity certificate. The CMS MUST NOT contain any spurious certificates. This CMS structure MAY (as applicable where this type is used) also contain suitably fresh (as defined by local policy) revocation objects with which the device can verify the revocation status of the certificates. This CMS encodes the degenerate form of the SignedData structure (RFC 5652, Section 5.2) that is commonly used to disseminate X.509 certificates and revocation objects (RFC 5280)."; reference "RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)"; } /*****************/ /* Groupings */ /*****************/ grouping encrypted-value-grouping { description "A reusable grouping for a value that has been encrypted by a referenced symmetric or asymmetric key."; container encrypted-by { nacm:default-deny-write; description "An empty container enabling a reference to the key that encrypted the value to be augmented in. The referenced key MUST be a symmetric key or an asymmetric key. A symmetric key MUST be referenced via a leaf node called 'symmetric-key-ref'. An asymmetric key MUST be referenced via a leaf node called 'asymmetric-key-ref'. The leaf nodes MUST be direct descendants in the data tree and MAY be direct descendants in the schema tree (e.g., 'choice'/'case' statements are allowed but not a container)."; } leaf encrypted-value-format { type identityref { base encrypted-value-format; } mandatory true; description "Identifies the format of the 'encrypted-value' leaf. If 'encrypted-by' points to a symmetric key, then an identity based on 'symmetrically-encrypted-value-format' MUST be set (e.g., 'cms-encrypted-data-format'). If 'encrypted-by' points to an asymmetric key, then an identity based on 'asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format' MUST be set (e.g., 'cms-enveloped-data-format')."; } leaf encrypted-value { nacm:default-deny-write; type binary; must '../encrypted-by'; mandatory true; description "The value, encrypted using the referenced symmetric or asymmetric key. The value MUST be encoded using the format associated with the 'encrypted-value-format' leaf."; } } grouping password-grouping { description "A password used for authenticating to a remote system. The 'ianach:crypt-hash' typedef from RFC 7317 should be used instead when needing a password to authenticate a local account."; choice password-type { nacm:default-deny-write; mandatory true; description "Choice between password types."; case cleartext-password { if-feature "cleartext-passwords"; leaf cleartext-password { nacm:default-deny-all; type string; description "The cleartext value of the password."; } } case encrypted-password { if-feature "encrypted-passwords"; container encrypted-password { description "A container for the encrypted password value."; uses encrypted-value-grouping; } } } } grouping symmetric-key-grouping { description "A symmetric key."; leaf key-format { nacm:default-deny-write; type identityref { base symmetric-key-format; } description "Identifies the symmetric key's format. Implementations SHOULD ensure that the incoming symmetric key value is encoded in the specified format. For encrypted keys, the value is the decrypted key's format (i.e., the 'encrypted-value-format' conveys the encrypted key's format)."; } choice key-type { nacm:default-deny-write; mandatory true; description "Choice between key types."; case cleartext-symmetric-key { leaf cleartext-symmetric-key { if-feature "cleartext-symmetric-keys"; nacm:default-deny-all; type binary; must '../key-format'; description "The binary value of the key. The interpretation of the value is defined by the 'key-format' field."; } } case hidden-symmetric-key { if-feature "hidden-symmetric-keys"; leaf hidden-symmetric-key { type empty; must 'not(../key-format)'; description "A hidden key is not exportable and not extractable; therefore, it is of type 'empty' as its value is inaccessible via management interfaces. Though hidden to users, such keys are not hidden to the server and may be referenced by configuration to indicate which key a server should use for a cryptographic operation. How such keys are created is outside the scope of this module."; } } case encrypted-symmetric-key { if-feature "encrypted-symmetric-keys"; container encrypted-symmetric-key { must '../key-format'; description "A container for the encrypted symmetric key value. The interpretation of the 'encrypted-value' node is via the 'key-format' node"; uses encrypted-value-grouping; } } } } grouping public-key-grouping { description "A public key."; leaf public-key-format { nacm:default-deny-write; type identityref { base public-key-format; } mandatory true; description "Identifies the public key's format. Implementations SHOULD ensure that the incoming public key value is encoded in the specified format."; } leaf public-key { nacm:default-deny-write; type binary; mandatory true; description "The binary value of the public key. The interpretation of the value is defined by the 'public-key-format' field."; } } grouping private-key-grouping { description "A private key."; leaf private-key-format { nacm:default-deny-write; type identityref { base private-key-format; } description "Identifies the private key's format. Implementations SHOULD ensure that the incoming private key value is encoded in the specified format. For encrypted keys, the value is the decrypted key's format (i.e., the 'encrypted-value-format' conveys the encrypted key's format)."; } choice private-key-type { nacm:default-deny-write; mandatory true; description "Choice between key types."; case cleartext-private-key { if-feature "cleartext-private-keys"; leaf cleartext-private-key { nacm:default-deny-all; type binary; must '../private-key-format'; description "The value of the binary key. The key's value is interpreted by the 'private-key-format' field."; } } case hidden-private-key { if-feature "hidden-private-keys"; leaf hidden-private-key { type empty; must 'not(../private-key-format)'; description "A hidden key. It is of type 'empty' as its value is inaccessible via management interfaces. Though hidden to users, such keys are not hidden to the server and may be referenced by configuration to indicate which key a server should use for a cryptographic operation. How such keys are created is outside the scope of this module."; } } case encrypted-private-key { if-feature "encrypted-private-keys"; container encrypted-private-key { must '../private-key-format'; description "A container for the encrypted asymmetric private key value. The interpretation of the 'encrypted-value' node is via the 'private-key-format' node"; uses encrypted-value-grouping; } } } } grouping asymmetric-key-pair-grouping { description "A private key and, optionally, its associated public key. Implementations MUST ensure that the two keys, when both are specified, are a matching pair."; uses public-key-grouping { refine "public-key-format" { mandatory false; } refine "public-key" { mandatory false; } } uses private-key-grouping; } grouping certificate-expiration-grouping { description "A notification for when a certificate is about to expire or has already expired."; notification certificate-expiration { if-feature "certificate-expiration-notification"; description "A notification indicating that the configured certificate is either about to expire or has already expired. When to send notifications is an implementation-specific decision, but it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a month for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and then once a day thereafter until the issue is resolved. If the certificate's issuer maintains a Certificate Revocation List (CRL), the expiration notification MAY be sent if the CRL is about to expire."; leaf expiration-date { type yang:date-and-time; mandatory true; description "Identifies the expiration date on the certificate."; } } } grouping trust-anchor-cert-grouping { description "A trust anchor certificate and a notification for when it is about to expire or has already expired."; leaf cert-data { nacm:default-deny-all; type trust-anchor-cert-cms; description "The binary certificate data for this certificate."; } uses certificate-expiration-grouping; } grouping end-entity-cert-grouping { description "An end-entity certificate and a notification for when it is about to expire or has already expired. Implementations SHOULD assert that, where used, the end-entity certificate contains the expected public key."; leaf cert-data { nacm:default-deny-all; type end-entity-cert-cms; description "The binary certificate data for this certificate."; } uses certificate-expiration-grouping; } grouping generate-csr-grouping { description "Defines the 'generate-csr' action."; action generate-csr { if-feature "csr-generation"; nacm:default-deny-all; description "Generates a certificate signing request structure for the associated asymmetric key using the passed subject and attribute values. This 'action' statement is only available when the associated 'public-key-format' node's value is 'subject-public-key-info-format'."; input { leaf csr-format { type identityref { base csr-format; } mandatory true; description "Specifies the format for the returned certificate."; } leaf csr-info { type csr-info; mandatory true; description "A CertificationRequestInfo structure, as defined in RFC 2986. Enables the client to provide a fully populated CertificationRequestInfo structure that the server only needs to sign in order to generate the complete CertificationRequest structure to return in the 'output'. The 'AlgorithmIdentifier' field contained inside the 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo' field MUST be one known to be supported by the device."; reference "RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification RFC 9640: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography"; } } output { choice csr-type { mandatory true; description "A choice amongst certificate signing request formats. Additional formats MAY be augmented into this 'choice' statement by future efforts."; case p10-csr { leaf p10-csr { type p10-csr; description "A CertificationRequest, as defined in RFC 2986."; } description "A CertificationRequest, as defined in RFC 2986."; reference "RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification RFC 9640: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography"; } } } } } // generate-csr-grouping grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping { description "A private/public key pair and an associated certificate. Implementations MUST assert that the certificate contains the matching public key."; uses asymmetric-key-pair-grouping; uses end-entity-cert-grouping; uses generate-csr-grouping; } // asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping { description "A private/public key pair and a list of associated certificates. Implementations MUST assert that certificates contain the matching public key."; uses asymmetric-key-pair-grouping; container certificates { nacm:default-deny-write; description "Certificates associated with this asymmetric key."; list certificate { key "name"; description "A certificate for this asymmetric key."; leaf name { type string; description "An arbitrary name for the certificate."; } uses end-entity-cert-grouping { refine "cert-data" { mandatory true; } } } } uses generate-csr-grouping; } // asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping } <CODE ENDS>¶
This document uses PKCS #10 [RFC2986] for the "generate-certificate-signing-request" action. The use of Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) [RFC4211] was considered, but it was unclear if there was market demand for it. If it is desired to support CRMF in the future, a backwards compatible solution can be defined at that time.¶
Early revisions of this document included "rpc" statements for generating symmetric and asymmetric keys. These statements were removed due to an inability to obtain consensus for how to generically identify the key algorithm to use. Hence, the solution presented in this document only supports keys to be configured via an external client.¶
Separate protocol-specific modules can present protocol-specific key-generating RPCs (e.g., the "generate-asymmetric-key-pair" RPC in [RFC9644] and [RFC9645]).¶
This module defines the "public-key-grouping" grouping, which enables the configuration of public keys without constraints on their usage, e.g., what operations the key is allowed to be used for (e.g., encryption, verification, or both).¶
The "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping uses the aforementioned "public-key-grouping" grouping and carries the same traits.¶
The "asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping" grouping uses the aforementioned "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping, whereby associated certificates MUST constrain the usage of the public key according to local policy.¶
This module defines the "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping, which enables the configuration of private keys without constraints on their usage, e.g., what operations the key is allowed to be used for (e.g., signature, decryption, or both).¶
The "asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping" grouping uses the aforementioned "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping, whereby configured certificates (e.g., identity certificates) may constrain the use of the public key according to local policy.¶
The module contained within this document enables, only when specific "feature" statements are enabled, for the cleartext value of passwords and keys to be stored in the configuration database. Storing cleartext values for passwords and keys is NOT RECOMMENDED.¶
The module contained within this document enables cleartext passwords and keys to be encrypted via another key, either symmetric or asymmetric. Both formats use a CMS structure (EncryptedData and EnvelopedData, respectively), which allows any encryption algorithm to be used.¶
To securely encrypt a password or key with a symmetric key, a proper block cipher mode, such as an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) or Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), MUST be used. This ensures that a random Initialization Vector (IV) is part of the input, which guarantees that the output for encrypting the same password or key still produces a different unpredictable ciphertext. This avoids leaking that some encrypted keys or passwords are the same and makes it much harder to pre-generate rainbow tables to brute-force attack weak passwords. The Electronic Codebook (ECB) block cipher mode MUST NOT be used.¶
This module defines storage for cleartext key values that SHOULD be zeroized when deleted so as to prevent the remnants of their persisted storage locations from being analyzed in any meaningful way.¶
The cleartext key values are the "cleartext-symmetric-key" node defined in the "symmetric-key-grouping" grouping (Section 2.1.4.3) and the "cleartext-private-key" node defined in the "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping (Section 2.1.4.6).¶
This section is modeled after the template defined in Section 3.7.1 of [RFC8407].¶
The YANG module in this document defines "grouping" statements that are designed to be accessed via YANG-based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual authentication.¶
The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a preconfigured subset of all available protocol operations and content.¶
Since the module in this document only defines groupings, these considerations are primarily for the designers of other modules that use these groupings.¶
Some of the readable data nodes defined in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or notification) to these data nodes. The following subtrees and data nodes have particular sensitivity/vulnerability:¶
The "cleartext-password" node:¶
The "cleartext-symmetric-key" node:¶
The "cleartext-private-key" node:¶
The "cert-data" node:¶
All the writable data nodes defined by all the groupings defined in this module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. For instance, even the modification of a public key or a certificate can dramatically alter the implemented security policy. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been applied to all the data nodes defined in the module.¶
Some of the operations in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control access to these operations. These are the operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability:¶
generate-certificate-signing-request:¶
IANA has registered the following URI in the "ns" registry of the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688].¶
IANA has registered the following YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC6020].¶
The authors would like to thank the following for lively discussions on list and in the halls (ordered by first name): Balázs Kovács, Carsten Bormann, Dale Worley, Eric Voit, Éric Vyncke, Francesca Palombini, Jürgen Schönwälder, Lars Eggert, Liang Xia, Mahesh Jethanandani, Martin Björklund, Murray Kucherawy, Nick Hancock, Orie Steele, Paul Wouters, Rich Salz, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef, Rob Wilton, Roman Danyliw, Russ Housley, Sandra Murphy, Tom Petch, Valery Smyslov, Wang Haiguang, Warren Kumari, and Zaheduzzaman Sarker.¶