rfc9642.original   rfc9642.txt 
NETCONF Working Group K. Watsen Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) K. Watsen
Internet-Draft Watsen Networks Request for Comments: 9642 Watsen Networks
Intended status: Standards Track 16 March 2024 Category: Standards Track August 2024
Expires: 17 September 2024 ISSN: 2070-1721
A YANG Data Model for a Keystore and Keystore Operations A YANG Data Model for a Keystore and Keystore Operations
draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-35
Abstract Abstract
This document presents a YANG module called "ietf-keystore" that This document presents a YANG module called "ietf-keystore" that
enables centralized configuration of both symmetric and asymmetric enables centralized configuration of both symmetric and asymmetric
keys. The secret value for both key types may be encrypted or keys. The secret value for both key types may be encrypted or
hidden. Asymmetric keys may be associated with certificates. hidden. Asymmetric keys may be associated with certificates.
Notifications are sent when certificates are about to expire. Notifications are sent when certificates are about to expire.
Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)
This draft contains placeholder values that need to be replaced with
finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes
all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor
instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.
Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in
progress. Please apply the following replacements:
* AAAA --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-
types
* CCCC --> the assigned RFC value for this draft
Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of
publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement:
* 2024-03-16 --> the publication date of this draft
The "Relation to other RFCs" section Section 1.1 contains the text
"one or more YANG modules" and, later, "modules". This text is
sourced from a file in a context where it is unknown how many modules
a draft defines. The text is not wrong as is, but it may be improved
by stating more directly how many modules are defined.
The "Relation to other RFCs" section Section 1.1 contains a self-
reference to this draft, along with a corresponding reference in the
Appendix. Please replace the self-reference in this section with
"This RFC" (or similar) and remove the self-reference in the
"Normative/Informative References" section, whichever it is in.
Tree-diagrams in this draft may use the '\' line-folding mode defined
in RFC 8792. However, nicer-to-the-eye is when the '\\' line-folding
mode is used. The AD suggested suggested putting a request here for
the RFC Editor to help convert "ugly" '\' folded examples to use the
'\\' folding mode. "Help convert" may be interpreted as, identify
what looks ugly and ask the authors to make the adjustment.
The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:
* Appendix A. Change Log
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on 17 September 2024. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9642.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights publication of this document. Please review these documents
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extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction
1.1. Relation to other RFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Relation to Other RFCs
1.2. Specification Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.2. Specification Language
1.3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.3. Terminology
1.4. Adherence to the NMDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.4. Adherence to the NMDA
1.5. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.5. Conventions
2. The "ietf-keystore" Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. The "ietf-keystore" Module
2.1. Data Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1. Data Model Overview
2.2. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.2. Example Usage
2.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 2.3. YANG Module
3. Support for Built-in Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3. Support for Built-In Keys
4. Encrypting Keys in Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 4. Encrypting Keys in Configuration
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 5. Security Considerations
5.1. Security of Data at Rest and in Motion . . . . . . . . . 43 5.1. Security of Data at Rest and in Motion
5.2. Unconstrained Private Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 5.2. Unconstrained Private Key Usage
5.3. Considerations for the "ietf-keystore" YANG Module . . . 43 5.3. Security Considerations for the "ietf-keystore" YANG Module
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6. IANA Considerations
6.1. The "IETF XML" Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6.1. The IETF XML Registry
6.2. The "YANG Module Names" Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6.2. The YANG Module Names Registry
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 7. References
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 7.1. Normative References
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7.2. Informative References
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Acknowledgements
A.1. 00 to 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Author's Address
A.2. 01 to 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
A.3. 02 to 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
A.4. 03 to 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
A.5. 04 to 05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
A.6. 05 to 06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
A.7. 06 to 07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A.8. 07 to 08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A.9. 08 to 09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A.10. 09 to 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A.11. 10 to 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A.12. 11 to 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A.13. 12 to 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A.14. 13 to 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A.15. 14 to 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A.16. 15 to 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A.17. 16 to 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A.18. 17 to 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A.19. 18 to 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A.20. 19 to 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A.21. 20 to 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A.22. 21 to 22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A.23. 22 to 23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A.24. 23 to 24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A.25. 24 to 25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A.26. 25 to 26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A.27. 26 to 27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A.28. 27 to 28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A.29. 28 to 29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A.30. 29 to 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A.31. 30 to 31 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A.32. 31 to 33 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A.33. 33 to 34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A.34. 34 to 35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document presents a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module called "ietf- This document presents a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module called "ietf-
keystore" that enables centralized configuration of both symmetric keystore" that enables centralized configuration of both symmetric
and asymmetric keys. The secret value for both key types may be and asymmetric keys. The secret value for both key types may be
encrypted or hidden (see [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]). encrypted or hidden (see [RFC9640]). Asymmetric keys may be
Asymmetric keys may be associated with certificates. Notifications associated with certificates. Notifications are sent when
are sent when certificates are about to expire. certificates are about to expire.
The "ietf-keystore" module defines many "grouping" statements The "ietf-keystore" module defines many "grouping" statements
intended for use by other modules that may import it. For instance, intended for use by other modules that may import it. For instance,
there are groupings that define enabling a key to be either there are groupings that define enabling a key to be configured
configured inline (within the defining data model) or as a reference either inline (within the defining data model) or as a reference to a
to a key in the central keystore. key in the central keystore.
Special consideration has been given for servers that have Special consideration has been given for servers that have
cryptographic hardware, such as a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). cryptographic hardware, such as a trusted platform module (TPM).
These servers are unique in that the cryptographic hardware hides the These servers are unique in that the cryptographic hardware hides the
secret key values. Additionally, such hardware is commonly secret key values. Additionally, such hardware is commonly
initialized when manufactured to protect a "built-in" asymmetric key initialized when manufactured to protect a "built-in" asymmetric key
for which its public half is conveyed in an identity certificate for which its public half is conveyed in an identity certificate
(e.g., an IDevID [Std-802.1AR-2018] certificate). Please see (e.g., an Initial Device Identifier (IDevID) [Std-802.1AR-2018]
Section 3 to see how built-in keys are supported. certificate). See how built-in keys are supported in Section 3.
This document is intended to reflect existing practices that many This document is intended to reflect existing practices that many
server implementations support at the time of writing. To simplify server implementations support at the time of writing. To simplify
implementation, advanced key formats may be selectively implemented. implementation, advanced key formats may be selectively implemented.
Implementations may utilize operating-system level keystore utilities Implementations may utilize operating-system level keystore utilities
(e.g., "Keychain Access" on MacOS) and/or cryptographic hardware (e.g., "Keychain Access" on MacOS) and/or cryptographic hardware
(e.g., TPMs). (e.g., TPMs).
1.1. Relation to other RFCs 1.1. Relation to Other RFCs
This document presents one or more YANG modules [RFC7950] that are This document presents a YANG module [RFC7950] that is part of a
part of a collection of RFCs that work together to, ultimately, collection of RFCs that work together to ultimately support the
support the configuration of both the clients and servers of both the configuration of both the clients and servers of the Network
NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040] protocols. Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040].
The dependency relationship between the primary YANG groupings The dependency relationship between the primary YANG groupings
defined in the various RFCs is presented in the below diagram. In defined in the various RFCs is presented in the diagram below. In
some cases, a draft may define secondary groupings that introduce some cases, a document may define secondary groupings that introduce
dependencies not illustrated in the diagram. The labels in the dependencies not illustrated in the diagram. The labels in the
diagram are a shorthand name for the defining RFC. The citation diagram are shorthand names for the defining RFCs. The citation
reference for shorthand name is provided below the diagram. references for the shorthand names are provided below the diagram.
Please note that the arrows in the diagram point from referencer to Please note that the arrows in the diagram point from referencer to
referenced. For example, the "crypto-types" RFC does not have any referenced. For example, the "crypto-types" RFC does not have any
dependencies, whilst the "keystore" RFC depends on the "crypto-types" dependencies, whilst the "keystore" RFC depends on the "crypto-types"
RFC. RFC.
crypto-types crypto-types
^ ^ ^ ^
/ \ / \
/ \ / \
skipping to change at page 6, line 5 skipping to change at line 147
| | | | | ^ | | | | | ^
| | | +-----+ +---------+ | | | | +-----+ +---------+ |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| +-----------|--------|--------------+ | | | +-----------|--------|--------------+ | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
+-----------+ | | | | | +-----------+ | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
netconf-client-server restconf-client-server netconf-client-server restconf-client-server
+======================+===========================================+ +========================+==========================+
|Label in Diagram | Originating RFC | | Label in Diagram | Originating RFC |
+======================+===========================================+ +========================+==========================+
|crypto-types | [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types] | | crypto-types | [RFC9640] |
+----------------------+-------------------------------------------+ +------------------------+--------------------------+
|truststore | [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] | | truststore | [RFC9641] |
+----------------------+-------------------------------------------+ +------------------------+--------------------------+
|keystore | [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] | | keystore | RFC 9642 |
+----------------------+-------------------------------------------+ +------------------------+--------------------------+
|tcp-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server] | | tcp-client-server | [RFC9643] |
+----------------------+-------------------------------------------+ +------------------------+--------------------------+
|ssh-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server] | | ssh-client-server | [RFC9644] |
+----------------------+-------------------------------------------+ +------------------------+--------------------------+
|tls-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server] | | tls-client-server | [RFC9645] |
+----------------------+-------------------------------------------+ +------------------------+--------------------------+
|http-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-http-client-server] | | http-client-server | [HTTP-CLIENT-SERVER] |
+----------------------+-------------------------------------------+ +------------------------+--------------------------+
|netconf-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server] | | netconf-client-server | [NETCONF-CLIENT-SERVER] |
+----------------------+-------------------------------------------+ +------------------------+--------------------------+
|restconf-client-server| [I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server] | | restconf-client-server | [RESTCONF-CLIENT-SERVER] |
+----------------------+-------------------------------------------+ +------------------------+--------------------------+
Table 1: Label in Diagram to RFC Mapping Table 1: Labels in Diagram to RFC Mapping
1.2. Specification Language 1.2. Specification Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
1.3. Terminology 1.3. Terminology
The terms "client" and "server" are defined in [RFC6241] and are not The terms "client" and "server" are defined in [RFC6241] and are not
redefined here. redefined here.
The term "keystore" is defined in this document as a mechanism that The term "keystore" is defined in this document as a mechanism that
intends to safeguard secrets. intends to safeguard secrets.
The nomenclature "<running>" and "<operational>" are defined in The nomenclatures "<running>" and "<operational>" are defined in
[RFC8342]. [RFC8342].
The sentence fragments "augmented" and "augmented in" are used herein The sentence fragments "augmented" and "augmented in" are used herein
as the past tense verbified form of the "augment" statement defined as the past tense verbified form of the "augment" statement defined
in Section 7.17 of [RFC7950]. in Section 7.17 of [RFC7950].
The term "key" may be used to mean one of three things in this The term "key" may be used to mean one of three things in this
document: 1) the YANG-defined "asymmetric-key" or "symmetric-key" document: 1) the YANG-defined "asymmetric-key" or "symmetric-key"
node defined in this document, 2) the raw key data possessed by the node defined in this document, 2) the raw key data possessed by the
aforementioned key nodes, and 3) the "key" of a YANG "list" aforementioned key nodes, or 3) the "key" of a YANG "list" statement.
statement. This document attempts to always qualify types '2' and This document attempts to always qualify types '2' and '3' using "raw
'3' using, "raw key value" and "YANG list key" where needed. In all key value" and "YANG list key" where needed. In all other cases, an
other cases, an unqualified "key" refers to a YANG-defined unqualified "key" refers to a YANG-defined "asymmetric-key" or
"asymmetric-key" or "symmetric-key" node. "symmetric-key" node.
1.4. Adherence to the NMDA 1.4. Adherence to the NMDA
This document is compliant with Network Management Datastore This document is compliant with Network Management Datastore
Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. For instance, keys and associated Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. For instance, keys and associated
certificates installed during manufacturing (e.g., for an IDevID certificates installed during manufacturing (e.g., for an IDevID
certificate) are expected to appear in <operational> (see Section 3). certificate) are expected to appear in <operational> (see Section 3).
1.5. Conventions 1.5. Conventions
Various examples in this document use "BASE64VALUE=" as a placeholder Various examples in this document use "BASE64VALUE=" as a placeholder
value for binary data that has been base64 encoded (per Section 9.8 value for binary data that has been base64-encoded (per Section 9.8
of [RFC7950]). This placeholder value is used because real base64 of [RFC7950]). This placeholder value is used because real
encoded structures are often many lines long and hence distracting to base64-encoded structures are often many lines long and hence
the example being presented. distracting to the example being presented.
This document uses the adjective "central" to the word "keystore" to This document uses the adjective "central" to the word "keystore" to
refer to the top-level instance of the "keystore-grouping", when the refer to the top-level instance of the "keystore-grouping", when the
"central-keystore-supported" feature is enabled. Please be aware "central-keystore-supported" feature is enabled. Please be aware
that consuming YANG modules MAY instantiate the "keystore-grouping" that consuming YANG modules MAY instantiate the "keystore-grouping"
in other locations. All such other instances are not the "central" in other locations. All such other instances are not the "central"
instance. instance.
2. The "ietf-keystore" Module 2. The "ietf-keystore" Module
skipping to change at page 8, line 33 skipping to change at line 271
The diagram above uses syntax that is similar to but not defined in The diagram above uses syntax that is similar to but not defined in
[RFC8340]. [RFC8340].
Comments: Comments:
* All the typedefs defined in the "ietf-keystore" module extend the * All the typedefs defined in the "ietf-keystore" module extend the
base "leafref" type defined in [RFC7950]. base "leafref" type defined in [RFC7950].
* The leafrefs refer to symmetric and asymmetric keys in the central * The leafrefs refer to symmetric and asymmetric keys in the central
keystore, when this module is implemented. keystore when this module is implemented.
* These typedefs are provided as an aid to consuming modules that * These typedefs are provided as an aid to consuming modules that
import the "ietf-keystore" module. import the "ietf-keystore" module.
2.1.3. Groupings 2.1.3. Groupings
The "ietf-keystore" module defines the following "grouping" The "ietf-keystore" module defines the following "grouping"
statements: statements:
* encrypted-by-grouping * encrypted-by-grouping
skipping to change at page 10, line 34 skipping to change at line 367
offer an option for whether a symmetric key is defined inline or offer an option for whether a symmetric key is defined inline or
as a reference to a symmetric key in the keystore. as a reference to a symmetric key in the keystore.
* A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each * A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each
option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case" option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case"
statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to
reference a symmetric key in an alternate location. reference a symmetric key in an alternate location.
* For the "inline-definition" option, the definition uses the * For the "inline-definition" option, the definition uses the
"symmetric-key-grouping" grouping discussed in Section 2.1.4.3 of "symmetric-key-grouping" grouping discussed in Section 2.1.4.3 of
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. [RFC9640].
* For the "central-keystore" option, the "central-keystore- * For the "central-keystore" option, the "central-keystore-
reference" is an instance of the "symmetric-key-ref" discussed in reference" is an instance of the "symmetric-key-ref" discussed in
Section 2.1.2. Section 2.1.2.
2.1.3.4. The "inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" Grouping 2.1.3.4. The "inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "inline-or- The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "inline-or-
keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping: keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping:
skipping to change at page 11, line 29 skipping to change at line 402
offer an option for whether an asymmetric key is defined inline or offer an option for whether an asymmetric key is defined inline or
as a reference to an asymmetric key in the keystore. as a reference to an asymmetric key in the keystore.
* A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each * A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each
option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case" option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case"
statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to
reference an asymmetric key in an alternate location. reference an asymmetric key in an alternate location.
* For the "inline-definition" option, the definition uses the * For the "inline-definition" option, the definition uses the
"asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping discussed in "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping discussed in
Section 2.1.4.6 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. Section 2.1.4.6 of [RFC9640].
* For the "central-keystore" option, the "central-keystore- * For the "central-keystore" option, the "central-keystore-
reference" is an instance of the "asymmetric-key-ref" typedef reference" is an instance of the "asymmetric-key-ref" typedef
discussed in Section 2.1.2. discussed in Section 2.1.2.
2.1.3.5. The "inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping" 2.1.3.5. The "inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping"
Grouping Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "inline-or- The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "inline-or-
keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping" grouping: keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping" grouping:
skipping to change at page 12, line 18 skipping to change at line 439
defined inline or as a reference to an asymmetric key in the defined inline or as a reference to an asymmetric key in the
keystore. keystore.
* A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each * A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each
option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case" option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case"
statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to
reference an asymmetric key in an alternate location. reference an asymmetric key in an alternate location.
* For the "inline-definition" option, the definition uses the * For the "inline-definition" option, the definition uses the
"asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping discussed in "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping discussed in
Section 2.1.4.12 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. Section 2.1.4.12 of [RFC9640].
* For the "central-keystore" option, the "central-keystore- * For the "central-keystore" option, the "central-keystore-
reference" is an instance of the "asymmetric-key-ref" typedef reference" is an instance of the "asymmetric-key-ref" typedef
discussed in Section 2.1.2. discussed in Section 2.1.2.
2.1.3.6. The "inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" 2.1.3.6. The "inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping"
Grouping Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "inline-or- The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "inline-or-
keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" grouping: keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" grouping:
skipping to change at page 13, line 7 skipping to change at line 476
defined inline or as a reference to a symmetric key in the defined inline or as a reference to a symmetric key in the
keystore. keystore.
* A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each * A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each
option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case" option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case"
statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to
reference a symmetric key in an alternate location. reference a symmetric key in an alternate location.
* For the "inline-definition" option, the definition uses the * For the "inline-definition" option, the definition uses the
"asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping discussed in "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping discussed in
Section 2.1.4.12 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. Section 2.1.4.12 of [RFC9640].
* For the "central-keystore" option, the "central-keystore- * For the "central-keystore" option, the "central-keystore-
reference" uses the "central-asymmetric-key-certificate-ref- reference" uses the "central-asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-
grouping" grouping discussed in Section 2.1.3.2. grouping" grouping discussed in Section 2.1.3.2.
2.1.3.7. The "keystore-grouping" Grouping 2.1.3.7. The "keystore-grouping" Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "keystore- The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "keystore-
grouping" grouping: grouping" grouping:
skipping to change at page 13, line 32 skipping to change at line 501
| +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping | +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping
+-- symmetric-keys {symmetric-keys}? +-- symmetric-keys {symmetric-keys}?
+-- symmetric-key* [name] +-- symmetric-key* [name]
+-- name? string +-- name? string
+---u ct:symmetric-key-grouping +---u ct:symmetric-key-grouping
Comments: Comments:
* The "keystore-grouping" grouping defines a keystore instance as * The "keystore-grouping" grouping defines a keystore instance as
being composed of symmetric and asymmetric keys. The structure being composed of symmetric and asymmetric keys. The structure
for the symmetric and asymmetric keys is essentially the same, for the symmetric and asymmetric keys is essentially the same: a
being a "list" inside a "container". "list" inside a "container".
* For asymmetric keys, each "asymmetric-key" uses the "asymmetric- * For asymmetric keys, each "asymmetric-key" uses the "asymmetric-
key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping discussed in key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping discussed in
Section 2.1.4.12 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. Section 2.1.4.12 of [RFC9640].
* For symmetric keys, each "symmetric-key" uses the "symmetric-key- * For symmetric keys, each "symmetric-key" uses the "symmetric-key-
grouping" grouping discussed in Section 2.1.4.3 of grouping" grouping discussed in Section 2.1.4.3 of [RFC9640].
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
2.1.4. Protocol-accessible Nodes 2.1.4. Protocol-Accessible Nodes
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] lists all the protocol- The following tree diagram [RFC8340] lists all the protocol-
accessible nodes defined in the "ietf-keystore" module, without accessible nodes defined in the "ietf-keystore" module without
expanding the "grouping" statements: expanding the "grouping" statements:
module: ietf-keystore module: ietf-keystore
+--rw keystore {central-keystore-supported}? +--rw keystore {central-keystore-supported}?
+---u keystore-grouping +---u keystore-grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] lists all the protocol- The following tree diagram [RFC8340] lists all the protocol-
accessible nodes defined in the "ietf-keystore" module, with all accessible nodes defined in the "ietf-keystore" module, with all
"grouping" statements expanded, enabling the keystore's full "grouping" statements expanded, enabling the keystore's full
structure to be seen: structure to be seen:
skipping to change at page 16, line 6 skipping to change at line 616
* The protocol-accessible nodes for the "ietf-keystore" module are * The protocol-accessible nodes for the "ietf-keystore" module are
instances of the "keystore-grouping" grouping discussed in instances of the "keystore-grouping" grouping discussed in
Section 2.1.3.7. Section 2.1.3.7.
* The top-level node "keystore" is additionally constrained by the * The top-level node "keystore" is additionally constrained by the
feature "central-keystore-supported". feature "central-keystore-supported".
* The "keystore-grouping" grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.7. * The "keystore-grouping" grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.7.
* The reason for why "keystore-grouping" exists separate from the * The reason for why "keystore-grouping" exists separate from the
protocol-accessible nodes definition is so as to enable instances protocol-accessible nodes definition is to enable instances of the
of the keystore to be instantiated in other locations, as may be keystore to be instantiated in other locations, as may be needed
needed or desired by some modules. or desired by some modules.
2.2. Example Usage 2.2. Example Usage
The examples in this section are encoded using XML, such as might be The examples in this section are encoded using XML, such as might be
the case when using the NETCONF protocol. Other encodings MAY be the case when using the NETCONF protocol. Other encodings MAY be
used, such as JSON when using the RESTCONF protocol. used, such as JSON when using the RESTCONF protocol.
2.2.1. A Keystore Instance 2.2.1. A Keystore Instance
The following example illustrates keys in <running>. Please see The following example illustrates keys in <running>. Please see
skipping to change at page 19, line 39 skipping to change at line 787
This section illustrates the various "inline-or-keystore" groupings This section illustrates the various "inline-or-keystore" groupings
defined in the "ietf-keystore" module, specifically the "inline-or- defined in the "ietf-keystore" module, specifically the "inline-or-
keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" (Section 2.1.3.3), "inline-or- keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" (Section 2.1.3.3), "inline-or-
keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" (Section 2.1.3.4), "inline-or- keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" (Section 2.1.3.4), "inline-or-
keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping" (Section 2.1.3.5), and keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping" (Section 2.1.3.5), and
"inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" "inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping"
(Section 2.1.3.6) groupings. (Section 2.1.3.6) groupings.
These examples assume the existence of an example module called "ex- These examples assume the existence of an example module called "ex-
keystore-usage" having the namespace "https://example.com/ns/example- keystore-usage" that has the namespace "https://example.com/ns/
keystore-usage". example-keystore-usage".
The ex-keystore-usage module is first presented using tree diagrams The ex-keystore-usage module is first presented using tree diagrams
[RFC8340], followed by an instance example illustrating all the [RFC8340], followed by an instance example illustrating all the
"inline-or-keystore" groupings in use, followed by the YANG module "inline-or-keystore" groupings in use, followed by the YANG module
itself. itself.
2.2.3.1. Tree Diagrams for the "ex-keystore-usage" Module 2.2.3.1. Tree Diagrams for the "ex-keystore-usage" Module
The following tree diagram illustrates "ex-keystore-usage" without The following tree diagram illustrates "ex-keystore-usage" without
expanding the "grouping" statements: expanding the "grouping" statements:
skipping to change at page 20, line 25 skipping to change at line 820
+--rw asymmetric-key-with-certs* [name] +--rw asymmetric-key-with-certs* [name]
| +--rw name | +--rw name
| | string | | string
| +---u ks:inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-groupi\ | +---u ks:inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-groupi\
ng ng
+--rw end-entity-cert-with-key* [name] +--rw end-entity-cert-with-key* [name]
+--rw name +--rw name
| string | string
+---u ks:inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping +---u ks:inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping
The following tree diagram illustrates the "ex-keystore-usage" The following tree diagram illustrates the "ex-keystore-usage" module
module, with all "grouping" statements expanded, enabling the usage's with all "grouping" statements expanded, enabling the usage's full
full structure to be seen: structure to be seen:
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
module: ex-keystore-usage module: ex-keystore-usage
+--rw keystore-usage +--rw keystore-usage
+--rw symmetric-key* [name] +--rw symmetric-key* [name]
| +--rw name string | +--rw name string
| +--rw (inline-or-keystore) | +--rw (inline-or-keystore)
| +--:(inline) {inline-definitions-supported}? | +--:(inline) {inline-definitions-supported}?
| | +--rw inline-definition | | +--rw inline-definition
skipping to change at page 23, line 33 skipping to change at line 973
instances are equivalent, as the inlined instance example contains instances are equivalent, as the inlined instance example contains
the same values defined by the keystore instance referenced by its the same values defined by the keystore instance referenced by its
sibling example. sibling example.
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
<keystore-usage <keystore-usage
xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage" xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"> xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
<!-- The following two equivalent examples illustrate the --> <!-- The following two equivalent examples illustrate the -->
<!-- "inline-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" grouping: --> <!-- "inline-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" grouping: -->
<symmetric-key> <symmetric-key>
<name>example 1a</name> <name>example 1a</name>
<central-keystore-reference>cleartext-symmetric-key</central-key\ <central-keystore-reference>cleartext-symmetric-key</central-key\
store-reference> store-reference>
</symmetric-key> </symmetric-key>
<symmetric-key> <symmetric-key>
<name>example 1b</name> <name>example 1b</name>
<inline-definition> <inline-definition>
<key-format>ct:octet-string-key-format</key-format> <key-format>ct:octet-string-key-format</key-format>
<cleartext-symmetric-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-symmetric-key> <cleartext-symmetric-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-symmetric-key>
</inline-definition> </inline-definition>
</symmetric-key> </symmetric-key>
<!-- The following two equivalent examples illustrate the --> <!-- The following two equivalent examples illustrate the -->
<!-- "inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping: --> <!-- "inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping: -->
<asymmetric-key> <asymmetric-key>
<name>example 2a</name> <name>example 2a</name>
<central-keystore-reference>rsa-asymmetric-key</central-keystore\ <central-keystore-reference>rsa-asymmetric-key</central-keystore\
-reference> -reference>
</asymmetric-key> </asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key> <asymmetric-key>
<name>example 2b</name> <name>example 2b</name>
<inline-definition> <inline-definition>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\ <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\
ey-format> ey-format>
<public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key> <public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-for\ <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-for\
mat> mat>
<cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key> <cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key>
</inline-definition> </inline-definition>
</asymmetric-key> </asymmetric-key>
<!-- the following two equivalent examples illustrate --> <!-- The following two equivalent examples illustrate the -->
<!-- "inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping": --> <!-- "inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping" -->
<!-- grouping: -->
<asymmetric-key-with-certs> <asymmetric-key-with-certs>
<name>example 3a</name> <name>example 3a</name>
<central-keystore-reference>rsa-asymmetric-key</central-keystore\ <central-keystore-reference>rsa-asymmetric-key</central-keystore\
-reference> -reference>
</asymmetric-key-with-certs> </asymmetric-key-with-certs>
<asymmetric-key-with-certs> <asymmetric-key-with-certs>
<name>example 3b</name> <name>example 3b</name>
<inline-definition> <inline-definition>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\ <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\
ey-format> ey-format>
<public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key> <public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-for\ <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-for\
mat> mat>
<cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key> <cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key>
<certificates> <certificates>
<certificate> <certificate>
<name>a locally-defined cert</name> <name>a locally defined cert</name>
<cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data> <cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data>
</certificate> </certificate>
</certificates> </certificates>
</inline-definition> </inline-definition>
</asymmetric-key-with-certs> </asymmetric-key-with-certs>
<!-- The following two equivalent examples illustrate -->
<!-- "inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping": -->
<!-- The following two equivalent examples illustrate the -->
<!-- "inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" -->
<!-- grouping: -->
<end-entity-cert-with-key> <end-entity-cert-with-key>
<name>example 4a</name> <name>example 4a</name>
<central-keystore-reference> <central-keystore-reference>
<asymmetric-key>rsa-asymmetric-key</asymmetric-key> <asymmetric-key>rsa-asymmetric-key</asymmetric-key>
<certificate>ex-rsa-cert</certificate> <certificate>ex-rsa-cert</certificate>
</central-keystore-reference> </central-keystore-reference>
</end-entity-cert-with-key> </end-entity-cert-with-key>
<end-entity-cert-with-key> <end-entity-cert-with-key>
<name>example 4b</name> <name>example 4b</name>
skipping to change at page 25, line 42 skipping to change at line 1077
Following is the "ex-keystore-usage" module's YANG definition: Following is the "ex-keystore-usage" module's YANG definition:
module ex-keystore-usage { module ex-keystore-usage {
yang-version 1.1; yang-version 1.1;
namespace "https://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage"; namespace "https://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage";
prefix ex-keystore-usage; prefix ex-keystore-usage;
import ietf-keystore { import ietf-keystore {
prefix ks; prefix ks;
reference reference
"RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore"; "RFC 9642: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore and Keystore
Operations";
} }
organization organization
"Example Corporation"; "Example Corporation";
contact contact
"Author: YANG Designer <mailto:yang.designer@example.com>"; "Author: YANG Designer <mailto:yang.designer@example.com>";
description description
"This example module illustrates notable groupings defined "This example module illustrates notable groupings defined
in the 'ietf-keystore' module."; in the 'ietf-keystore' module.";
revision 2024-03-16 { revision 2024-03-16 {
description description
"Initial version"; "Initial version";
reference reference
"RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore"; "RFC 9642: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore and Keystore
Operations";
} }
container keystore-usage { container keystore-usage {
description description
"An illustration of the various keystore groupings."; "An illustration of the various keystore groupings.";
list symmetric-key { list symmetric-key {
key "name"; key "name";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
skipping to change at page 27, line 5 skipping to change at line 1138
} }
list asymmetric-key-with-certs { list asymmetric-key-with-certs {
key "name"; key "name";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for this key."; "An arbitrary name for this key.";
} }
uses ks:inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping; uses ks:inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping;
description description
"An asymmetric key and its associated certs, that may be "An asymmetric key and its associated certs that may be
configured locally or be a reference to an asymmetric key configured locally or be a reference to an asymmetric
(and its associated certs) in the keystore."; key (and its associated certs) in the keystore.";
} }
list end-entity-cert-with-key { list end-entity-cert-with-key {
key "name"; key "name";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for this key."; "An arbitrary name for this key.";
} }
uses ks:inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping; uses ks:inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping;
description description
"An end-entity certificate and its associated asymmetric "An end-entity certificate and its associated asymmetric
key, that may be configured locally or be a reference key that may be configured locally or be a reference
to another certificate (and its associated asymmetric to another certificate (and its associated asymmetric
key) in the keystore."; key) in the keystore.";
} }
} }
} }
2.3. YANG Module 2.3. YANG Module
This YANG module has normative references to [RFC8341] and This YANG module has normative references to [RFC8341] and [RFC9640].
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-keystore@2024-03-16.yang" <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-keystore@2024-03-16.yang"
module ietf-keystore { module ietf-keystore {
yang-version 1.1; yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore";
prefix ks; prefix ks;
import ietf-netconf-acm { import ietf-netconf-acm {
prefix nacm; prefix nacm;
reference reference
"RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model"; "RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
} }
import ietf-crypto-types { import ietf-crypto-types {
prefix ct; prefix ct;
reference reference
"RFC AAAA: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography"; "RFC 9640: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
} }
organization organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group"; "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact contact
"WG Web: https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf "WG Web: https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf
WG List: NETCONF WG list <mailto:netconf@ietf.org> WG List: NETCONF WG list <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>"; Author: Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>";
description description
"This module defines a 'keystore' to centralize management "This module defines a 'keystore' to centralize management
of security credentials. of security credentials.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved. as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Revised subject to the license terms contained in, the Revised
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC CCCC This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9642
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcCCCC); see the RFC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9642); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices. itself for full legal notices.";
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2024-03-16 { revision 2024-03-16 {
description description
"Initial version"; "Initial version";
reference reference
"RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore"; "RFC 9642: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore and Keystore
Operations";
} }
/****************/ /****************/
/* Features */ /* Features */
/****************/ /****************/
feature central-keystore-supported { feature central-keystore-supported {
description description
"The 'central-keystore-supported' feature indicates that "The 'central-keystore-supported' feature indicates that
the server supports the central keystore (i.e., fully the server supports the central keystore (i.e., fully
skipping to change at page 29, line 4 skipping to change at line 1232
/****************/ /****************/
/* Features */ /* Features */
/****************/ /****************/
feature central-keystore-supported { feature central-keystore-supported {
description description
"The 'central-keystore-supported' feature indicates that "The 'central-keystore-supported' feature indicates that
the server supports the central keystore (i.e., fully the server supports the central keystore (i.e., fully
implements the 'ietf-keystore' module)."; implements the 'ietf-keystore' module).";
} }
feature inline-definitions-supported { feature inline-definitions-supported {
description description
"The 'inline-definitions-supported' feature indicates that "The 'inline-definitions-supported' feature indicates that
the server supports locally-defined keys."; the server supports locally defined keys.";
} }
feature asymmetric-keys { feature asymmetric-keys {
description description
"The 'asymmetric-keys' feature indicates that the server "The 'asymmetric-keys' feature indicates that the server
implements the /keystore/asymmetric-keys subtree."; implements the /keystore/asymmetric-keys subtree.";
} }
feature symmetric-keys { feature symmetric-keys {
skipping to change at page 30, line 8 skipping to change at line 1285
/*****************/ /*****************/
/* Groupings */ /* Groupings */
/*****************/ /*****************/
grouping encrypted-by-grouping { grouping encrypted-by-grouping {
description description
"A grouping that defines a 'choice' statement that can be "A grouping that defines a 'choice' statement that can be
augmented into the 'encrypted-by' node, present in the augmented into the 'encrypted-by' node, present in the
'symmetric-key-grouping' and 'asymmetric-key-pair-grouping' 'symmetric-key-grouping' and 'asymmetric-key-pair-grouping'
groupings defined in RFC AAAA, enabling references to keys groupings defined in RFC 9640, enabling references to keys
in the central keystore."; in the central keystore.";
choice encrypted-by { choice encrypted-by {
nacm:default-deny-write; nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"A choice amongst other symmetric or asymmetric keys."; "A choice amongst other symmetric or asymmetric keys.";
case central-symmetric-key-ref { case central-symmetric-key-ref {
if-feature "central-keystore-supported"; if-feature "central-keystore-supported";
if-feature "symmetric-keys"; if-feature "symmetric-keys";
leaf symmetric-key-ref { leaf symmetric-key-ref {
skipping to change at page 30, line 42 skipping to change at line 1319
encrypted the associated key."; encrypted the associated key.";
} }
} }
} }
} }
// *-ref groupings // *-ref groupings
grouping central-asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping { grouping central-asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping {
description description
"Grouping for the reference to a certificate associated "A grouping for the reference to a certificate associated
with an asymmetric key stored in the central keystore."; with an asymmetric key stored in the central keystore.";
leaf asymmetric-key { leaf asymmetric-key {
nacm:default-deny-write; nacm:default-deny-write;
if-feature "central-keystore-supported"; if-feature "central-keystore-supported";
if-feature "asymmetric-keys"; if-feature "asymmetric-keys";
type ks:central-asymmetric-key-ref; type ks:central-asymmetric-key-ref;
must '../certificate'; must '../certificate';
description description
"A reference to an asymmetric key in the keystore."; "A reference to an asymmetric key in the keystore.";
} }
leaf certificate { leaf certificate {
nacm:default-deny-write; nacm:default-deny-write;
type leafref { type leafref {
path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key" path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key"
+ "[ks:name = current()/../asymmetric-key]/" + "[ks:name = current()/../asymmetric-key]/"
+ "ks:certificates/ks:certificate/ks:name"; + "ks:certificates/ks:certificate/ks:name";
} }
must '../asymmetric-key'; must '../asymmetric-key';
description description
skipping to change at page 31, line 41 skipping to change at line 1365
choice inline-or-keystore { choice inline-or-keystore {
nacm:default-deny-write; nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"A choice between an inlined definition and a definition "A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
that exists in the keystore."; that exists in the keystore.";
case inline { case inline {
if-feature "inline-definitions-supported"; if-feature "inline-definitions-supported";
container inline-definition { container inline-definition {
description description
"Container to hold the local key definition."; "A container to hold the local key definition.";
uses ct:symmetric-key-grouping; uses ct:symmetric-key-grouping;
} }
} }
case central-keystore { case central-keystore {
if-feature "central-keystore-supported"; if-feature "central-keystore-supported";
if-feature "symmetric-keys"; if-feature "symmetric-keys";
leaf central-keystore-reference { leaf central-keystore-reference {
type ks:central-symmetric-key-ref; type ks:central-symmetric-key-ref;
description description
"A reference to an symmetric key that exists in "A reference to a symmetric key that exists in
the central keystore."; the central keystore.";
} }
} }
} }
} }
grouping inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping { grouping inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping {
description description
"A grouping for the configuration of an asymmetric key. The "A grouping for the configuration of an asymmetric key. The
asymmetric key may be defined inline or as a reference to asymmetric key may be defined inline or as a reference to
an asymmetric key stored in the central keystore. an asymmetric key stored in the central keystore.
Servers that wish to define alternate keystore locations Servers that wish to define alternate keystore locations
SHOULD augment in custom 'case' statements enabling SHOULD augment in custom 'case' statements enabling
references to those alternate keystore locations."; references to those alternate keystore locations.";
choice inline-or-keystore { choice inline-or-keystore {
nacm:default-deny-write; nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"A choice between an inlined definition and a definition "A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
that exists in the keystore."; that exists in the keystore.";
case inline { case inline {
if-feature "inline-definitions-supported"; if-feature "inline-definitions-supported";
container inline-definition { container inline-definition {
description description
"Container to hold the local key definition."; "A container to hold the local key definition.";
uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-grouping; uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
} }
} }
case central-keystore { case central-keystore {
if-feature "central-keystore-supported"; if-feature "central-keystore-supported";
if-feature "asymmetric-keys"; if-feature "asymmetric-keys";
leaf central-keystore-reference { leaf central-keystore-reference {
type ks:central-asymmetric-key-ref; type ks:central-asymmetric-key-ref;
description description
"A reference to an asymmetric key that exists in "A reference to an asymmetric key that exists in
skipping to change at page 33, line 20 skipping to change at line 1441
choice inline-or-keystore { choice inline-or-keystore {
nacm:default-deny-write; nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"A choice between an inlined definition and a definition "A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
that exists in the keystore."; that exists in the keystore.";
case inline { case inline {
if-feature "inline-definitions-supported"; if-feature "inline-definitions-supported";
container inline-definition { container inline-definition {
description description
"Container to hold the local key definition."; "A container to hold the local key definition.";
uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping; uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping;
} }
} }
case central-keystore { case central-keystore {
if-feature "central-keystore-supported"; if-feature "central-keystore-supported";
if-feature "asymmetric-keys"; if-feature "asymmetric-keys";
leaf central-keystore-reference { leaf central-keystore-reference {
type ks:central-asymmetric-key-ref; type ks:central-asymmetric-key-ref;
description description
"A reference to an asymmetric-key (and all of its "A reference to an asymmetric-key (and all of its
skipping to change at page 34, line 11 skipping to change at line 1480
choice inline-or-keystore { choice inline-or-keystore {
nacm:default-deny-write; nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"A choice between an inlined definition and a definition "A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
that exists in the keystore."; that exists in the keystore.";
case inline { case inline {
if-feature "inline-definitions-supported"; if-feature "inline-definitions-supported";
container inline-definition { container inline-definition {
description description
"Container to hold the local key definition."; "A container to hold the local key definition.";
uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping; uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping;
} }
} }
case central-keystore { case central-keystore {
if-feature "central-keystore-supported"; if-feature "central-keystore-supported";
if-feature "asymmetric-keys"; if-feature "asymmetric-keys";
container central-keystore-reference { container central-keystore-reference {
uses central-asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping; uses central-asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping;
description description
"A reference to a specific certificate associated with "A reference to a specific certificate associated with
an asymmetric key stored in the central keystore."; an asymmetric key stored in the central keystore.";
} }
} }
} }
} }
// the keystore grouping // the keystore grouping
grouping keystore-grouping { grouping keystore-grouping {
description description
"Grouping definition enables use in other contexts. If ever "A grouping definition enables use in other contexts. If ever
done, implementations MUST augment new 'case' statements done, implementations MUST augment new 'case' statements
into the various inline-or-keystore 'choice' statements to into the various inline-or-keystore 'choice' statements to
supply leafrefs to the model-specific location(s)."; supply leafrefs to the model-specific location(s).";
container asymmetric-keys { container asymmetric-keys {
nacm:default-deny-write; nacm:default-deny-write;
if-feature "asymmetric-keys"; if-feature "asymmetric-keys";
description description
"A list of asymmetric keys."; "A list of asymmetric keys.";
list asymmetric-key { list asymmetric-key {
key "name"; key "name";
skipping to change at page 35, line 30 skipping to change at line 1546
uses ct:symmetric-key-grouping; uses ct:symmetric-key-grouping;
} }
} }
} }
/*********************************/ /*********************************/
/* Protocol accessible nodes */ /* Protocol accessible nodes */
/*********************************/ /*********************************/
container keystore { container keystore {
if-feature central-keystore-supported; if-feature "central-keystore-supported";
description description
"A central keystore containing a list of symmetric keys and "A central keystore containing a list of symmetric keys and
a list of asymmetric keys."; a list of asymmetric keys.";
nacm:default-deny-write; nacm:default-deny-write;
uses keystore-grouping { uses keystore-grouping {
augment "symmetric-keys/symmetric-key/key-type/encrypted-" augment "symmetric-keys/symmetric-key/key-type/encrypted-"
+ "symmetric-key/encrypted-symmetric-key/encrypted-by" { + "symmetric-key/encrypted-symmetric-key/encrypted-by" {
description description
"Augments in a choice statement enabling the encrypting "Augments in a choice statement enabling the encrypting
key to be any other symmetric or asymmetric key in the key to be any other symmetric or asymmetric key in the
skipping to change at page 36, line 4 skipping to change at line 1569
} }
augment "asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key/private-key-type/" augment "asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key/private-key-type/"
+ "encrypted-private-key/encrypted-private-key/" + "encrypted-private-key/encrypted-private-key/"
+ "encrypted-by" { + "encrypted-by" {
description description
"Augments in a choice statement enabling the encrypting "Augments in a choice statement enabling the encrypting
key to be any other symmetric or asymmetric key in the key to be any other symmetric or asymmetric key in the
central keystore."; central keystore.";
uses encrypted-by-grouping; uses encrypted-by-grouping;
} }
} }
} }
} }
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
3. Support for Built-in Keys 3. Support for Built-In Keys
In some implementations, a server may support keys built into the In some implementations, a server may support keys built into the
server. Built-in keys MAY be set during the manufacturing process or server. Built-in keys MAY be set during the manufacturing process or
be dynamically generated the first time the server is booted or a be dynamically generated the first time the server is booted or a
particular service (e.g., SSH) is enabled. particular service (e.g., Secure Shell (SSH)) is enabled.
Built-in keys are "hidden" keys expected to be set by a vendor- Built-in keys are "hidden" keys expected to be set by a vendor-
specific process. Any ability for operators to set and/or modify specific process. Any ability for operators to set and/or modify
built-in keys is outside the scope of this document. built-in keys is outside the scope of this document.
The primary characteristic of the built-in keys is that they are The primary characteristic of the built-in keys is that they are
provided by the server, as opposed to configuration. As such, they provided by the server, as opposed to configuration. As such, they
are present in <operational> (Section 5.3 of [RFC8342]), and <system> are present in <operational> (Section 5.3 of [RFC8342]) and <system>
[I-D.ietf-netmod-system-config], if implemented. [NETMOD-SYSTEM-CONFIG], if implemented.
The example below illustrates what the keystore in <operational> The example below illustrates what the keystore in <operational>
might look like for a server in its factory default state. Note that might look like for a server in its factory default state. Note that
the built-in keys have the "or:origin" annotation value "or:system". the built-in keys have the "or:origin" annotation value "or:system".
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore" <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types" xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"
xmlns:or="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-origin" xmlns:or="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-origin"
skipping to change at page 38, line 41 skipping to change at line 1685
4. Encrypting Keys in Configuration 4. Encrypting Keys in Configuration
This section describes an approach that enables both the symmetric This section describes an approach that enables both the symmetric
and asymmetric keys on a server to be encrypted, such that and asymmetric keys on a server to be encrypted, such that
traditional backup/restore procedures can be used without concern for traditional backup/restore procedures can be used without concern for
raw key data being compromised when in transit. raw key data being compromised when in transit.
The approach presented in this section is not normative. This The approach presented in this section is not normative. This
section answers how a configuration containing secrets that are section answers how a configuration containing secrets that are
encrypted by a built-in key (Section 3) can be backup'ed from one encrypted by a built-in key (Section 3) can be backed up from one
server and restored on a different server, when each server has server and restored on a different server when each server has unique
unique master keys. The API defined by the "ietf-keystore" YANG master keys. The API defined by the "ietf-keystore" YANG module
module presented in this document is sufficient to support the presented in this document is sufficient to support the workflow
workflow described in this section. described in this section.
4.1. Key Encryption Key 4.1. Key Encryption Key
The ability to encrypt configured keys is predicated on the existence The ability to encrypt configured keys is predicated on the existence
of a "key encryption key" (KEK). There may be any number of KEKs in of a key encryption key (KEK). There may be any number of KEKs in a
a server. A KEK, by its namesake, is a key that is used to encrypt server. A KEK, by its namesake, is a key that is used to encrypt
other keys. A KEK MAY be either a symmetric key or an asymmetric other keys. A KEK MAY be either a symmetric key or an asymmetric
key. key.
If a KEK is a symmetric key, then the server MUST provide an API for If a KEK is a symmetric key, then the server MUST provide an API for
administrators to encrypt other keys without needing to know the administrators to encrypt other keys without needing to know the
symmetric key's value. If the KEK is an asymmetric key, then the symmetric key's value. If the KEK is an asymmetric key, then the
server SHOULD provide an API enabling the encryption of other keys server SHOULD provide an API enabling the encryption of other keys
or, alternatively, assume the administrators can do so themselves or, alternatively, assume the administrators can do so themselves
using the asymmetric key's public half. using the asymmetric key's public half.
A server MUST possess access to the KEK, or an API using the KEK, so A server MUST possess access to the KEK, or an API using the KEK, so
that it can decrypt the other keys in the configuration at runtime. that it can decrypt the other keys in the configuration at runtime.
4.2. Configuring Encrypted Keys 4.2. Configuring Encrypted Keys
Each time a new key is configured, it SHOULD be encrypted by a KEK. Each time a new key is configured, it SHOULD be encrypted by a KEK.
In "ietf-crypto-types" [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types], the format In "ietf-crypto-types" [RFC9640], the format for encrypted values is
for encrypted values is described by identity statements derived from described by identity statements derived from the "symmetrically-
the "symmetrically-encrypted-value-format" and "asymmetrically- encrypted-value-format" and "asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format"
encrypted-value-format" identity statements. identity statements.
Implementations of servers implementing the "ietf-keystore" module Implementations of servers implementing the "ietf-keystore" module
SHOULD provide an API that simultaneously generates a key and SHOULD provide an API that simultaneously generates a key and
encrypts the generated key using a KEK. Thus the cleartext value of encrypts the generated key using a KEK. Thus, the cleartext value of
the newly generated key may never be known to the administrators the newly generated key may never be known to the administrators
generating the keys. Such API is defined in the "ietf-ssh-common" generating the keys. Such an API is defined in the "ietf-ssh-common"
and the "ietf-tls-common" YANG modules defined in and "ietf-tls-common" YANG modules defined in [RFC9644] and
[I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server], and [RFC9645], respectively.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server], respectively.
In case the server implementation does not provide such an API, then In case the server implementation does not provide such an API, then
the generating and encrypting steps MAY be performed outside the the generating and encrypting steps MAY be performed outside the
server, e.g., by an administrator with special access control rights server, e.g., by an administrator with special access control rights
(e.g., an organization's crypto officer). (such as an organization's crypto officer).
In either case, the encrypted key can be configured into the keystore In either case, the encrypted key can be configured into the keystore
using either the "encrypted-symmetric-key" (for symmetric keys) or using either the "encrypted-symmetric-key" (for symmetric keys) or
the "encrypted-private-key" (for asymmetric keys) nodes. These two the "encrypted-private-key" (for asymmetric keys) nodes. These two
nodes contain both the encrypted raw key value as well as a reference nodes contain both the encrypted raw key value as well as a reference
to the KEK that encrypted the key. to the KEK that encrypted the key.
4.3. Migrating Configuration to Another Server 4.3. Migrating Configuration to Another Server
When a KEK is used to encrypt other keys, migrating the configuration When a KEK is used to encrypt other keys, migrating the configuration
to another server is only possible if the second server has the same to another server is only possible if the second server has the same
KEK. How the second server comes to have the same KEK is discussed KEK. How the second server comes to have the same KEK is discussed
in this section. in this section.
In some deployments, mechanisms outside the scope of this document In some deployments, mechanisms outside the scope of this document
may be used to migrate a KEK from one server to another. That said, may be used to migrate a KEK from one server to another. That said,
beware that the ability to do so typically entails having access to beware that the ability to do so typically entails having access to
the first server but, in some scenarios, the first server may no the first server; however, in some scenarios, the first server may no
longer be operational. longer be operational.
In other deployments, an organization's crypto officer, possessing a In other deployments, an organization's crypto officer, possessing a
KEK's cleartext value, configures the same KEK on the second server, KEK's cleartext value, configures the same KEK on the second server,
presumably as a hidden key or a key protected by access-control, so presumably as a hidden key or a key protected by access control, so
that the cleartext value is not disclosed to regular administrators. that the cleartext value is not disclosed to regular administrators.
However, this approach creates high-coupling to and dependency on the However, this approach creates high coupling to and dependency on the
crypto officers that does not scale in production environments. crypto officers that does not scale in production environments.
In order to decouple the crypto officers from the regular In order to decouple the crypto officers from the regular
administrators, a special KEK, called the "master key" (MK), may be administrators, a special KEK, called the "master key" (MK), may be
used. used.
A MK is commonly a globally-unique built-in (see Section 3) An MK is commonly a globally unique built-in (see Section 3)
asymmetric key. The private raw key value, due to its long lifetime, asymmetric key. The private raw key value, due to its long lifetime,
is hidden (i.e., "hidden-private-key" in Section 2.1.4.5. of is hidden (i.e., "hidden-private-key"; see Section 2.1.4.5. of
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]). The raw public key value is often [RFC9640]). The raw public key value is often contained in an
contained in an identity certificate (e.g., IDevID). How to identity certificate (e.g., IDevID). How to configure an MK during
configure a MK during the manufacturing process is outside the scope the manufacturing process is outside the scope of this document.
of this document.
Assuming the server has a MK, the MK can be used to encrypt a "shared Assuming the server has an MK, the MK can be used to encrypt a
KEK", which is then used to encrypt the keys configured by regular "shared KEK", which is then used to encrypt the keys configured by
administrators. regular administrators.
With this extra level of indirection, it is possible for a crypto With this extra level of indirection, it is possible for a crypto
officer to encrypt the same KEK for a multiplicity of servers offline officer to encrypt the same KEK for a multiplicity of servers offline
using the public key contained in their identity certificates. The using the public key contained in their identity certificates. The
crypto officer can then safely handoff the encrypted KEKs to regular crypto officer can then safely hand off the encrypted KEKs to regular
administrators responsible for server installations, including administrators responsible for server installations, including
migrations. migrations.
In order to migrate the configuration from a first server, an In order to migrate the configuration from a first server, an
administrator would need to make just a single modification to the administrator would need to make just a single modification to the
configuration before loading it onto a second server, which is to configuration before loading it onto a second server, which is to
replace the encrypted KEK keystore entry from the first server with replace the encrypted KEK keystore entry from the first server with
the encrypted KEK for the second server. Upon doing this, the the encrypted KEK for the second server. Upon doing this, the
configuration (containing many encrypted keys) can be loaded into the configuration (containing many encrypted keys) can be loaded into the
second server while enabling the second server to decrypt all the second server while enabling the second server to decrypt all the
skipping to change at page 43, line 13 skipping to change at line 1846
+----------------------+ +----------------------+ +----------------------+ +----------------------+
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
5.1. Security of Data at Rest and in Motion 5.1. Security of Data at Rest and in Motion
The YANG module defined in this document defines a mechanism called a The YANG module defined in this document defines a mechanism called a
"keystore" that intends to protect its contents from unauthorized "keystore" that intends to protect its contents from unauthorized
disclosure and modification. disclosure and modification.
In order to satisfy the expectations of a "keystore", it is In order to satisfy the expectations of a keystore, it is RECOMMENDED
RECOMMENDED that server implementations ensure that the keystore that server implementations ensure that the keystore contents are
contents are encrypted when persisted to non-volatile memory, and encrypted when persisted to non-volatile memory and that the keystore
ensure that the keystore contents that have been decrypted in contents that have been decrypted in volatile memory are zeroized
volatile memory are zeroized when not in use. when not in use.
The keystore contents may be encrypted either by encrypting the The keystore contents may be encrypted by either encrypting the
contents individually (e.g., using the "encrypted" value formats) or, contents individually (e.g., using the "encrypted" value formats) or
in case cleartext values are used (which is NOT RECOMMENDED per using disk-level encryption, for example, in case cleartext values
Section 3.5 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]), then, e.g., disk- are used (which is NOT RECOMMENDED per Section 3.5 of [RFC9640]).
level encryption may be used.
If the keystore contents are not encrypted when persisted, then If the keystore contents are not encrypted when persisted, then
server implementations MUST ensure the persisted storage is server implementations MUST ensure the persisted storage is
inaccessible. inaccessible.
5.2. Unconstrained Private Key Usage 5.2. Unconstrained Private Key Usage
This module enables the configuration of private keys without This module enables the configuration of private keys without
constraints on their usage, e.g., what operations the key is allowed constraints on their usage, e.g., what operations the key is allowed
to be used for (e.g., signature, decryption, both). to be used for (such as signature, decryption, or both).
This module also does not constrain the usage of the associated This module also does not constrain the usage of the associated
public keys, other than in the context of a configured certificate public keys other than in the context of a configured certificate
(e.g., an identity certificate), in which case the key usage is (e.g., an identity certificate), in which case the key usage is
constrained by the certificate. constrained by the certificate.
5.3. Considerations for the "ietf-keystore" YANG Module 5.3. Security Considerations for the "ietf-keystore" YANG Module
This section follows the template defined in Section 3.7.1 of This section follows the template defined in Section 3.7.1 of
[RFC8407]. [RFC8407].
The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed The YANG module specified in this document defines a schema for data
via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and that is designed to be accessed via network management protocols such
RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to- as NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols
implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., Secure
authentication. Shell (SSH), TLS) with mutual authentication.
The Network Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341]
to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a
all available protocol operations and content. preconfigured subset of all available protocol operations and
content.
Please be aware that this YANG module uses groupings from other YANG Please be aware that this YANG module uses groupings from other YANG
modules that define nodes that may be considered sensitive or modules that define nodes that may be considered sensitive or
vulnerable in network environments. Please review the Security vulnerable in network environments. Please review the Security
Considerations for dependent YANG modules for information as to which Considerations for dependent YANG modules for information as to which
nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in network nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in network
environments. environments.
Some of the readable data nodes defined in this YANG module may be Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered
considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or
or notification) to these data nodes. The following subtrees and notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data
data nodes have particular sensitivity/vulnerability: nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
* The "cleartext-symmetric-key" node:
The "cleartext-symmetric-key" node, imported from the
"symmetric-key-grouping" grouping defined in
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types] is additionally sensitive to
read operations such that, in normal use cases, it should never
be returned to a client. For this reason, the NACM extension
"default-deny-all" was applied to it in
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
* The "cleartext-private-key" node: The "cleartext-symmetric-key" node:
This node, imported from the "symmetric-key-grouping" grouping
defined in [RFC9640], is additionally sensitive to read operations
such that, in normal use cases, it should never be returned to a
client. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-all"
was applied to it in [RFC9640].
The "cleartext-private-key" node defined in the "asymmetric- The "cleartext-private-key" node:
key-pair-grouping" grouping defined in This node, defined in the "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types] is additionally sensitive to in [RFC9640], is additionally sensitive to read operations such
read operations such that, in normal use cases, it should never that, in normal use cases, it should never be returned to a
be returned to a client. For this reason, the NACM extension client. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-all" is
"default-deny-all" is applied to it in applied to it in [RFC9640].
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
All the writable data nodes defined by this module, both in the All the writable data nodes defined by this YANG module, both in the
"grouping" statements as well as the protocol-accessible "keystore" "grouping" statements as well as the protocol-accessible "keystore"
instance, may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network instance, may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network
environments. For instance, any modification to a key or reference environments. For instance, any modification to a key or reference
to a key may dramatically alter the implemented security policy. For to a key may dramatically alter the implemented security policy. For
this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been set for this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been set for
all data nodes defined in this module. all data nodes defined in this module.
This module does not define any "rpc" or "action" statements, and This YANG module does not define any "rpc" or "action" statements,
thus the security considerations for such is not provided here. and thus the security considerations for such is not provided here.
Built-in key types SHOULD be either hidden and/or encrypted (not Built-in key types SHOULD be hidden and/or encrypted (not cleartext).
cleartext). If this is not possible, access control mechanisms like If this is not possible, access control mechanisms like NACM SHOULD
NACM SHOULD be used to limit access to the key's secret data to only be used to limit access to the key's secret data to only the most
the most trusted authorized clients (e.g., belonging to an trusted authorized clients (e.g., belonging to an organization's
organization’s crypto officer). crypto officer).
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
6.1. The "IETF XML" Registry 6.1. The IETF XML Registry
This document registers one URI in the "ns" subregistry of the IETF IANA has registered the following URI in the "ns" registry of the
XML Registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688].
following registration is requested:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore
Registrant Contact: The IESG Registrant Contact: The IESG
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
6.2. The "YANG Module Names" Registry 6.2. The YANG Module Names Registry
This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names IANA has registered the following YANG module in the "YANG Module
registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the following Names" registry defined in [RFC6020].
registration is requested:
name: ietf-keystore Name: ietf-keystore
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore Maintained by IANA: N
prefix: ks Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore
reference: RFC CCCC Prefix: ks
Reference: RFC 9642
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]
Watsen, K., "YANG Data Types and Groupings for
Cryptography", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-netconf-crypto-types-33, 1 March 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
crypto-types-33>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", [RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016, RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration [RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341, Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.
[RFC9640] Watsen, K., "YANG Data Types and Groupings for
Cryptography", RFC 9640, DOI 10.17487/RFC9640, August
2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9640>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-netconf-http-client-server] [HTTP-CLIENT-SERVER]
Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for HTTP Clients and HTTP Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for HTTP Clients and HTTP
Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
netconf-http-client-server-19, 1 March 2024, netconf-http-client-server-23, 15 August 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
http-client-server-19>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]
Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore and Keystore
Operations", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
netconf-keystore-34, 1 March 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
keystore-34>. http-client-server-23>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server] [NETCONF-CLIENT-SERVER]
Watsen, K., "NETCONF Client and Server Models", Work in Watsen, K., "NETCONF Client and Server Models", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-netconf- Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-
client-server-35, 1 March 2024, client-server-37, 14 August 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
netconf-client-server-35>. netconf-client-server-37>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server] [NETMOD-SYSTEM-CONFIG]
Ma, Q., Ed., Wu, Q., and C. Feng, "System-defined
Configuration", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-netmod-system-config-08, 18 June 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netmod-
system-config-08>.
[RESTCONF-CLIENT-SERVER]
Watsen, K., "RESTCONF Client and Server Models", Work in Watsen, K., "RESTCONF Client and Server Models", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-restconf- Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-
client-server-35, 1 March 2024, client-server-38, 14 August 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
restconf-client-server-35>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server]
Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH
Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
netconf-ssh-client-server-39, 1 March 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
ssh-client-server-39>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server]
Watsen, K. and M. Scharf, "YANG Groupings for TCP Clients
and TCP Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server-23, 1 March 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
tcp-client-server-23>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server]
Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS
Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
netconf-tls-client-server-40, 1 March 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
tls-client-server-40>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors]
Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Truststore", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-trust-
anchors-27, 1 March 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
trust-anchors-27>. restconf-client-server-38>.
[I-D.ietf-netmod-system-config]
Ma, Q., Wu, Q., and C. Feng, "System-defined
Configuration", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-netmod-system-config-05, 21 February 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netmod-
system-config-05>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams", [RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018, BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
[RFC8342] Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K., [RFC8342] Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K.,
and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture
(NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342, March 2018, (NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8342>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8342>.
[RFC8407] Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of [RFC8407] Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of
Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407, Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407>.
[Std-802.1AR-2018] [RFC9641] Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Truststore",
IEEE SA-Standards Board, "IEEE Standard for Local and RFC 9641, DOI 10.17487/RFC9641, August 2024,
metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity", <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9641>.
August 2018,
<https://standards.ieee.org/standard/802_1AR-2018.html>.
Appendix A. Change Log
A.1. 00 to 01
* Replaced the 'certificate-chain' structures with PKCS#7
structures. (Issue #1)
* Added 'private-key' as a configurable data node, and removed the
'generate-private-key' and 'load-private-key' actions. (Issue #2)
* Moved 'user-auth-credentials' to the ietf-ssh-client module.
(Issues #4 and #5)
A.2. 01 to 02
* Added back 'generate-private-key' action.
* Removed 'RESTRICTED' enum from the 'private-key' leaf type.
* Fixed up a few description statements.
A.3. 02 to 03
* Changed draft's title.
* Added missing references.
* Collapsed sections and levels.
* Added RFC 8174 to Requirements Language Section.
* Renamed 'trusted-certificates' to 'pinned-certificates'.
* Changed 'public-key' from config false to config true.
* Switched 'host-key' from OneAsymmetricKey to definition from RFC
4253.
A.4. 03 to 04
* Added typedefs around leafrefs to common keystore paths
* Now tree diagrams reference ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams
* Removed Design Considerations section
* Moved key and certificate definitions from data tree to groupings
A.5. 04 to 05
* Removed trust anchors (now in their own draft)
* Added back global keystore structure
* Added groupings enabling keys to either be locally defined or a
reference to the keystore.
A.6. 05 to 06
* Added feature "local-keys-supported"
* Added nacm:default-deny-all and nacm:default-deny-write
* Renamed generate-asymmetric-key to generate-hidden-key
* Added an install-hidden-key action
* Moved actions inside fo the "asymmetric-key" container
* Moved some groupings to draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types
A.7. 06 to 07
* Removed a "require-instance false"
* Clarified some description statements
* Improved the keystore-usage examples
A.8. 07 to 08
* Added "inline-definition" containers to avoid posibility of the
action/notification statements being under a "case" statement.
* Updated copyright date, boilerplate template, affiliation, folding
algorithm, and reformatted the YANG module.
A.9. 08 to 09
* Added a 'description' statement to the 'must' in the /keystore/
asymmetric-key node explaining that the descendant values may
exist in <operational> only, and that implementation MUST assert
that the values are either configured or that they exist in
<operational>.
* Copied above 'must' statement (and description) into the inline-
or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping, inline-or-keystore-
asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping, and inline-or-keystore-end-
entity-cert-with-key-grouping statements.
A.10. 09 to 10
* Updated draft title to match new truststore draft title
* Moved everything under a top-level 'grouping' to enable use in
other contexts.
* Renamed feature from 'local-keys-supported' to 'inline-
definitions-supported' (same name used in truststore)
* Removed the either-all-or-none 'must' expressions for the key's
3-tuple values (since the values are now 'mandatory true' in
crypto-types)
* Example updated to reflect 'mandatory true' change in crypto-types
draft
A.11. 10 to 11
* Replaced typedef asymmetric-key-certificate-ref with grouping
asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping.
* Added feature feature 'key-generation'.
* Cloned groupings symmetric-key-grouping, asymmetric-key-pair-
grouping, asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping, and asymmetric-
key-pair-with-certs-grouping from crypto-keys, augmenting into
each new case statements for values that have been encrypted by
other keys in the keystore. Refactored keystore model to use
these groupings.
* Added new 'symmetric-keys' lists, as a sibling to the existing
'asymmetric-keys' list.
* Added RPCs (not actions) 'generate-symmetric-key' and 'generate-
asymmetric-key' to *return* a (potentially encrypted) key.
A.12. 11 to 12
* Updated to reflect crypto-type's draft using enumerations over
identities.
* Added examples for the 'generate-symmetric-key' and 'generate-
asymmetric-key' RPCs.
* Updated the Introduction section.
A.13. 12 to 13
* Updated examples to incorporate new "key-format" identities.
* Made the two "generate-*-key" RPCs be "action" statements instead.
A.14. 13 to 14
* Updated YANG module and examples to incorporate the new
iana-*-algorithm modules in the crypto-types draft.
A.15. 14 to 15
* Added new "Support for Built-in Keys" section.
* Added 'must' expressions asserting that the 'key-format' leaf
whenever an encrypted key is specified.
* Added inline-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping for PSK support.
A.16. 15 to 16
* Moved the generate key actions to ietf-crypt-types as RPCs, which
are augmented by ietf-keystore to support encrypted keys.
Examples updated accordingly.
* Added a SSH certificate-based key (RFC 6187) and a raw private key
to the example instance document (partly so they could be
referenced by examples in the SSH and TLS client/server drafts.
A.17. 16 to 17
* Removed augments to the "generate-symmetric-key" and "generate-
asymmetric-key" groupings.
* Removed "generate-symmetric-key" and "generate-asymmetric-key"
examples.
* Removed the "algorithm" nodes from remaining examples.
* Updated the "Support for Built-in Keys" section.
* Added new section "Encrypting Keys in Configuration".
* Added a "Note to Reviewers" note to first page.
A.18. 17 to 18
* Removed dangling/unnecessary ref to RFC 8342.
* r/MUST/SHOULD/ wrt strength of keys being configured over
transports.
* Added an example for the "certificate-expiration" notification.
* Clarified that OS MAY have a multiplicity of underlying keystores
and/or TPMs.
* Clarified expected behavior for "built-in" keys in <operational>
* Clarified the "Migrating Configuration to Another Server" section.
* Expanded "Data Model Overview section(s) [remove "wall" of tree
diagrams].
* Updated the Security Considerations section.
A.19. 18 to 19
* Updated examples to reflect new "cleartext-" prefix in the crypto-
types draft.
A.20. 19 to 20
* Addressed SecDir comments from Magnus Nystroem and Sandra Murphy.
A.21. 20 to 21
* Added a "Unconstrained Private Key Usage" Security Consideration
to address concern raised by SecDir.
* (Editorial) Removed the output of "grouping" statements in the
tree diagrams for the "ietf-keystore" and "ex-keystore-usage"
modules.
* Addressed comments raised by YANG Doctor.
A.22. 21 to 22
* Added prefixes to 'path' statements per trust-anchors/issues/1
* Renamed feature "keystore-supported" to "central-keystore-
supported".
* Associated with above, generally moved text to refer to a
"central" keystore.
* Aligned modules with `pyang -f` formatting.
* Fixed nits found by YANG Doctor reviews.
A.23. 22 to 23
* Updated 802.1AR ref to latest version
* Replaced "base64encodedvalue==" with "BASE64VALUE=" in examples.
* Minor editorial nits
A.24. 23 to 24
* Added features "asymmetric-keys" and "symmetric-keys"
* fixup the 'WG Web' and 'WG List' lines in YANG module(s)
* fixup copyright (i.e., s/Simplified/Revised/) in YANG module(s)
* Added Informative reference to ma-netmod-with-system
A.25. 24 to 25
* Added a "term" for "key" (IEEE liaison).
* Clarified draft text to ensure proper use of the "key" term.
(IEEE liaison)
* Added statement that built-in keys SHOULD NOT be cleartext. (IEEE
liaison)
* Added "if-feature central-keystore-supported" to top-level
"keystore" container.
A.26. 25 to 26
* Updated per Shepherd reviews impacting the suite of drafts.
A.27. 26 to 27
* Updated per Shepherd reviews impacting the suite of drafts.
A.28. 27 to 28
* Updated per Tom Petch review.
* s/local/inline/ in feature names, grouping names, and node names.
* Removed special handling text for built-in keys
* Updated section on built-in keys to read almost the same as the
section in the trust-anchors draft.
A.29. 28 to 29
* Addresses AD review comments.
* Added note to Editor to fix line foldings.
* Renamed "keystore" to "central keystore" throughout.
* Renamed "encrypted-by-choice-grouping" to "encrypted-by-grouping".
* Removed "public-key-format" and "public-key" nodes from examples.
A.30. 29 to 30
* Addresses Gen-ART review by Reese Enghardt.
* Addresses review by Tom Petch.
A.31. 30 to 31
* Addresses 1st-round of IESG reviews.
A.32. 31 to 33
* Addresses issues found in OpsDir review of the ssh-client-server
draft.
* Renamed Security Considerations section s/Template for/
Considerations for/
* s/defines/presents/ in a few places.
* Add refs to where the 'operational' and 'system' datastores are
defined.
A.33. 33 to 34 [RFC9643] Watsen, K. and M. Scharf, "YANG Groupings for TCP Clients
and TCP Servers", RFC 9643, DOI 10.17487/RFC9643, August
2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9643>.
* Nothing changed. Only bumped for automation... [RFC9644] Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH
Servers", RFC 9644, DOI 10.17487/RFC9644, August 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9644>.
A.34. 34 to 35 [RFC9645] Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS
Servers", RFC 9645, DOI 10.17487/RFC9645, August 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9645>.
* Address Roman Danyliw's comments. [Std-802.1AR-2018]
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area
Networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE Std 802.1AR-2018,
DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794, August 2018,
<https://standards.ieee.org/standard/802_1AR-2018.html>.
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the following for lively discussions The authors would like to thank the following for lively discussions
on list and in the halls (ordered by first name): Alan Luchuk, Andy on list and in the halls (ordered by first name): Alan Luchuk, Andy
Bierman, Benoit Claise, Bert Wijnen, Balázs Kovács, David Lamparter, Bierman, Balázs Kovács, Benoit Claise, Bert Wijnen, David Lamparter,
Eric Voit, Éric Vyncke, Francesca Palombini, Ladislav Lhotka, Liang Eric Voit, Éric Vyncke, Francesca Palombini, Jürgen Schönwälder,
Xia, Jürgen Schönwälder, Mahesh Jethanandani, Magnus Nyström, Martin Ladislav Lhotka, Liang Xia, Magnus Nyström, Mahesh Jethanandani,
Björklund, Mehmet Ersue, Murray Kucherawy, Paul Wouters, Phil Shafer, Martin Björklund, Mehmet Ersue, Murray Kucherawy, Paul Wouters, Phil
Qin Wu, Radek Krejci, Ramkumar Dhanapal, Reese Enghardt, Reshad Shafer, Qin Wu, Radek Krejci, Ramkumar Dhanapal, Reese Enghardt,
Rahman, Rob Wilton, Roman Danyliw, Sandra Murphy, Sean Turner, Tom Reshad Rahman, Rob Wilton, Roman Danyliw, Sandra Murphy, Sean Turner,
Petch, Warren Kumari, and Zaheduzzaman Sarker. Tom Petch, Warren Kumari, and Zaheduzzaman Sarker.
Author's Address Author's Address
Kent Watsen Kent Watsen
Watsen Networks Watsen Networks
Email: kent+ietf@watsen.net Email: kent+ietf@watsen.net
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