Network Working Group
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Housley
Internet-Draft
Request for Comments: 9688 Vigil Security
Intended status:
Category: Standards Track 16 May 2024
Expires: 17 November 2024
ISSN: 2070-1721
Use of the SHA3 One-way One-Way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-lamps-cms-sha3-hash-04
Abstract
This document describes the conventions for using the one-way hash
functions in the SHA3 family with the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS). The SHA3 family can be used as a message digest algorithm, as
part of a signature algorithm, as part of a message authentication
code, or as part of a key derivation function. Key Derivation Function (KDF).
Status of This Memo
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https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9688.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. ASN.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Message Digest Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. ECDSA with SHA3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Message Authentication Codes using Using HMAC and SHA3 . . . . . . 6
5. Key Derivation Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. HKDF with SHA3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. KMAC128-KDF and KMAC256-KDF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3. KDF2 and KDF3 with SHA3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Acknowledgements
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. Introduction
The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is used to digitally
sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message contents.
This specification describes the use of the four one-way hash
functions in the SHA3 family (SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and
SHA3-512) [SHA3] with the CMS. In addition, this specification
describes the use of these four one-way hash functions with the
RSASSA PKCS#1 version 1.5 signature algorithm [RFC8017] and the
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [DSS] with the CMS
signed-data content type.
This document should not be confused with RFC 8702 [RFC8702], which defines
conventions for using the the SHAKE family of SHA3-based extensible
output functions with the CMS.
1.1. ASN.1
CMS values are generated using ASN.1 [X.680], using the Basic
Encoding Rules (BER) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
[X.690].
1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Message Digest Algorithms
One-way hash functions are also referred to as message digest
algorithms. This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS
implementations that support SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and
SHA3-512 [SHA3].
Digest algorithm identifiers are located in the SignedData
digestAlgorithms field, the SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field, the
DigestedData digestAlgorithm field, and the AuthenticatedData
digestAlgorithm field.
Digest values are located in the DigestedData digest field and the
Message Digest authenticated attribute. In addition, digest values
are input to signature algorithms.
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 produce output values with
224, 256, 384, and 512 bits, respectively. The object identifiers
for these four one-way hash functions are as follows:
hashAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 }
id-sha3-224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 7 }
id-sha3-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 8 }
id-sha3-384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 9 }
id-sha3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 10 }
When using the id-sha3-224, id-sha3-s256, id-sha3-384, or id-sha3-512
algorithm identifiers, the parameters field MUST be absent; absent, not NULL
but absent.
3. Signature Algorithms
This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS
implementations that support the four SHA3 one-way hash functions
with the RSASSA PKCS#1 version 1.5 signature algorithm [RFC8017] and
the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) ECDSA [DSS] with the CMS signed-data content type.
Signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo
signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData. Also, signature algorithm
identifiers are located in the SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field of
countersignature attributes.
Signature values are located in the SignerInfo signature field of
SignedData. Also, signature values are located in the SignerInfo
signature field of countersignature attributes.
3.1. RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA3
The RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 is defined in [RFC8017]. When RSASSA PKCS#1
v1.5 is used in conjunction with one of the SHA3 one-way hash
functions, the object identifiers are:
OID ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
sigAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3 }
id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-224 OID ::= { sigAlgs 13 }
id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-256 OID ::= { sigAlgs 14 }
id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-384 OID ::= { sigAlgs 15 }
id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-512 OID ::= { sigAlgs 16 }
The algorithm identifier for RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 subject public keys
in certificates is specified in [RFC3279], and it is repeated here
for convenience:
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1 }
When the rsaEncryption, id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-224, id-
rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-256, id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-384,
and id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-512 algorithm identifier is identifiers are
used, the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST contain NULL.
When the rsaEncryption algorithm identifier is used, the RSA public
key, which is composed of a modulus and a public exponent, MUST be
encoded using the RSAPublicKey type as specified in [RFC3279]. The
output of this encoding is carried in the certificate subject public
key. The definition of RSAPublicKey is repeated here for
convenience:
RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
modulus INTEGER, -- n
publicExponent INTEGER } -- e
When signing, the RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm generates a
single value, and that value. That value is used directly as the signature value.
3.2. ECDSA with SHA3
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) ECDSA is defined in [DSS]. When the ECDSA is used in conjunction
with one of the SHA3 one-
way one-way hash functions, the object identifiers
are:
sigAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3 }
id-ecdsa-with-sha3-224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sigAlgs 9 }
id-ecdsa-with-sha3-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sigAlgs 10 }
id-ecdsa-with-sha3-384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sigAlgs 11 }
id-ecdsa-with-sha3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sigAlgs 12 }
When using the id-ecdsa-with-sha3-224, id-ecdsa-with-sha3-256, id-
ecdsa-with-sha3-384, and id-ecdsa-with-sha3-512 algorithm
identifiers, the parameters field MUST be absent; absent, not NULL but
absent.
The conventions for ECDSA public keys is are as specified in [RFC5480].
The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signers
certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.
When signing, the ECDSA algorithm generates two values. These values
are commonly referred to as r and s. To easily transfer these two
values as one signature, they MUST be ASN.1 encoded using the ECDSA-
Sig-Value defined in [RFC3279] and [RFC3279], which is repeated here for
convenience:
ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
r INTEGER,
s INTEGER }
4. Message Authentication Codes using Using HMAC and SHA3
This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS
implementations that support the HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
(HMAC) [RFC2104] with SHA3 message authentication code (MAC).
MAC algorithm identifiers are located in the AuthenticatedData
macAlgorithm field.
MAC values are located in the AuthenticatedData mac field.
When HMAC is used in conjunction with one of the SHA3 one-way hash
functions, the object identifiers are:
hashAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 }
id-hmacWithSHA3-224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 13 }
id-hmacWithSHA3-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 14 }
id-hmacWithSHA3-384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 15 }
id-hmacWithSHA3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 16 }
When the id-hmacWithSHA3-224, id-hmacWithSHA3-256, id-
hmacWithSHA3-384, and id-hmacWithSHA3-512 algorithm identifier is identifiers are
used, the parameters field MUST be absent; absent, not NULL but absent.
5. Key Derivation Functions
The CMS KEMRecipientInfo structure [I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-kemri] [RFC9629] is one place where
algorithm identifiers for key-derivation functions are needed.
5.1. HKDF with SHA3
This section assigns four algorithm identifiers that can be employed
by CMS implementations that support the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF) [RFC5869] with the SHA3 family of hash
functions.
When HKDF is used in conjunction with one of the SHA3 one-way hash
functions, the object identifiers are:
id-alg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) 3 }
id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg TBD1 32 }
id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg TBD2 33 }
id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg TBD3 34 }
id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg TBD4 35 }
When id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-224, id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-256, id-alg-
hkdf-with-sha3-384, or id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-512 is used in an
algorithm identifier, the parameters field MUST be absent; absent, not NULL
but absent.
5.2. KMAC128-KDF and KMAC256-KDF
This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS
implementations that employ either the KMAC128 or KMAC256 as a key
derivation function KDFs as
defined in Section 4.4 of [NIST.SP.800-108r1-upd1].
KMAC128 and KMAC256 are specified in [NIST.SP.800-185]. The use of
KMAC128 and KMAC256 as a key derivation function KDFs are defined as: as follows:
KMAC128-KDF is KMAC128(K, X, L, S).
KMAC256-KDF is KMAC256(K, X, L, S).
The parameters to the KMAC128 and KMAC256 functions are:
K the The input key-derivation key. The length of K MUST be less than
2^2040.
X the The context, which contains the ASN.1 DER encoding of
CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo when the KDF is used with
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-kemri]. [RFC9629].
L the The output length, length in bits. L MUST be greater than or equal to
0, 0
and L MUST be less than 2^2040.
S the The optional customization label, such as "KDF" (0x4B4446). The
length of S MUST be less than 2^2040.
The K parameter is known to all authorized parties; it is often the
output of a KEM Decap() operation. The X parameter is assembled from
data that is transmitted by the originator. The L parameter is
determined by the size of the output keying material. The S
parameter is optional, and if it is provided by the originator, it is
passed in the parameters field of the KDF algorithm identifier.
When KMAC128-KDF or KMAC256-KDF is used, the object identifiers are:
hashAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 }
id-kmac128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 21 }
id-kmac256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 22 }
When the id-kmac128 or id-kmac256 is used as part of an algorithm
identifier, the parameters field MUST be absent when there is no
customization label S. (S). If any value is provided for S, then the
parameters field MUST be present and contain the value of S, encoded
as Customization.
Customization ::= OCTET STRING
5.3. KDF2 and KDF3 with SHA3
This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS
implementations that employ either the KDF2 or KDF3 functions defined
in [ANS-X9.44]. The CMS KEMRecipientInfo structure
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-kemri] [RFC9629] is one
place where algorithm identifiers for key-derivation functions are
needed.
The key-derivation function algorithm identifier is an object
identifier and optional parameters. parameter. When KDF2 and KDF3 are used, they
are identified by the id-kdf-kdf2 and id-kdf-kdf3 object identifiers,
respectively. The key-derivation function algorithm identifier
parameters carry a message digest algorithm identifier, which
indicates the hash function that is being employed. To support SHA3,
the key-derivation function algorithm identifier parameters contain
an algorithm identifier from Section 2.
x9-44 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
tc68(133) country(16) x9(840) x9Standards(9) x9-44(44) }
x9-44-components OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { x9-44 components(1) }
id-kdf-kdf2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { x9-44-components kdf2(1) }
id-kdf-kdf3 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { x9-44-components kdf3(2) }
6. Security Considerations
Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of
the signer's private key permits masquerade.
Implementations must protect the key-derivation key. Compromise of
the key-derivation key permits others to derive the derived keying
material, which would result in loss of confidentiality, integrity,
or authentication, depending on the use of the derived keying
material.
When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key,
data origin authentication is not assured. Any party that knows the
message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore MAC; therefore, the
content could originate from any one of the parties.
Implementations must randomly generate message-authentication keys
and one-time values, such as the k value when generating a an ECDSA
signature. In addition, the generation of public/private key pairs
relies on a random numbers. The use of inadequate pseudo-random pseudorandom
number generators (PRNGs) to generate cryptographic values can result
in little or no security. Instead of brute force brute-force searching the whole
key space, an attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG
environment that produced the keys, keys and then search the resulting
small set of possibilities. The generation of quality random numbers
is difficult. RFC 4086 [RFC4086] offers important guidance in this area, and
Appendix 3 of FIPS Pub PUB 186-4 [DSS] provides some PRNG techniques.
Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms become
weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and
computing performance improves, the work factor to break a particular
cryptographic algorithm will reduce. Therefore, cryptographic
algorithm implementations should be modular modular, allowing new algorithms
to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should be prepared to
regularly update the set of algorithms in their implementations.
7. IANA Considerations
IANA is asked to assign has assigned one object identifier for the ASN.1 module in
Appendix "Appendix. ASN.1 Module" A in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifiers
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry [IANA-MOD]:
id-mod-sha3-oids-2023 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) mod(0) TBD0 78 }
IANA is asked to assign has assigned four object identifiers for the HKDF using SHA3
algorithm identifiers in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Algorithms
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.3)" registry [IANA-ALG]:
id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg TBD1 32 }
id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg TBD2 33 }
id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg TBD3 34 }
id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg TBD4 35 }
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Daniel Van Geest and Sean Turner for their careful review
and thoughtful comments.
Thanks to Sara Kerman, Quynh Dang, and David Cooper for getting the
object identifiers assigned for KMAC128 and KMAC256.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[ANS-X9.44]
American National Standards Institute, "Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry -- Key
Establishment Using Integer Factorization Cryptography",
American National Standard X9.44, 2007.
ANSI X9.44-2007 (R2017), 2017,
<https://webstore.ansi.org/standards/ascx9/
ansix9442007r2017>.
[DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-5,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5, 3 February 2023,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf>.
[NIST.SP.800-108r1-upd1]
National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Chen, L., "Recommendation for key derivation using pseudorandom
functions", Key Derivation Using
Pseudorandom Functions", NIST SP 800-108r1-upd1,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-108r1-upd1, 2 February 2024,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-108r1-upd1.pdf>.
[NIST.SP.800-185]
National Institute of Standards
Kelsey, J., Chang, S., and Technology, R. Perlner, "SHA-3 Derived
Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and ParallelHash", NIST Special Publication
SP 800-185, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-185, December 2016,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-185.pdf>.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2104>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3279>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5480>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5652>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5869>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5912>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output
Functions", NIST FIPS PUB 202, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202,
August 2015,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf>.
[X.680] ITU-T, "Information technology -- - Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T
Recommendation X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1:2021, February 2021,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680>.
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680-202102-I/en>.
[X.690] ITU-T, "Information technology -- - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1:2021,
February 2021, <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680>.
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690-202102-I/en>.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-kemri]
Housley, R., Gray, J., and T. Okubo, "Using Key
Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) Algorithms in the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cms-kemri-08, 6 February
2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
lamps-cms-kemri-08>.
[IANA-ALG] IANA, "SMI Security for for S/MIME Algorithms
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.3)", n.d.,
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/>.
[IANA-MOD] IANA, "SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)", n.d.,
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4086>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC8702] Kampanakis, P. and Q. Dang, "Use of the SHAKE One-Way Hash
Functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 8702, DOI 10.17487/RFC8702, January 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8702>.
Appendix.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8702>.
[RFC9629] Housley, R., Gray, J., and T. Okubo, "Using Key
Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) Algorithms in the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 9629,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9629, August 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9629>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
This section contains the ASN.1 module for the algorithm identifiers
using the SHA3 family of hash functions [SHA3]. This module imports
types from other ASN.1 modules that are defined in [RFC5912].
<CODE BEGINS>
SHA3-OIDs-2023
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-sha3-oids-2023(TBD0) id-mod-sha3-oids-2023(78) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS
AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM,
KEY-DERIVATION, MAC-ALGORITHM
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
mda-sha1, pk-rsa, pk-ec, ECDSA-Sig-Value
FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 -- [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) }
mda-sha224, mda-sha256, mda-sha384, mda-sha512
FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009 -- [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs-02(54) } ;
--
-- Alias
--
OID ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
--
-- Object Identifier Arcs
--
nistAlgorithm OID ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) 4 }
hashAlgs OID ::= { nistAlgorithm 2 }
sigAlgs OID ::= { nistAlgorithm 3 }
x9-44 OID ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133)
country(16) x9(840) x9Standards(9) x9-44(44) }
x9-44-components OID ::= { x9-44 components(1) }
id-alg OID ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) 3 }
--
-- Message Digest Algorithms
--
id-sha3-224 OID ::= { hashAlgs 7 }
id-sha3-256 OID ::= { hashAlgs 8 }
id-sha3-384 OID ::= { hashAlgs 9 }
id-sha3-512 OID ::= { hashAlgs 10 }
mda-sha3-224 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-sha3-224
PARAMS ARE absent }
mda-sha3-256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-sha3-256
PARAMS ARE absent }
mda-sha3-384 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-sha3-384
PARAMS ARE absent }
mda-sha3-512 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-sha3-512
PARAMS ARE absent }
HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
{ HashAlgorithms } }
HashAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
mda-sha3-224 |
mda-sha3-256 |
mda-sha3-384 |
mda-sha3-512,
... }
--
-- Signature Algorithms
--
id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-224 OID ::= { sigAlgs 13 }
id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-256 OID ::= { sigAlgs 14 }
id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-384 OID ::= { sigAlgs 15 }
id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-512 OID ::= { sigAlgs 16 }
id-ecdsa-with-sha3-224 OID ::= { sigAlgs 9 }
id-ecdsa-with-sha3-256 OID ::= { sigAlgs 10 }
id-ecdsa-with-sha3-384 OID ::= { sigAlgs 11 }
id-ecdsa-with-sha3-512 OID ::= { sigAlgs 12 }
sa-rsaWithSHA3-224 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-224
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required
HASHES { mda-sha3-224 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa }
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY
id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-224 } }
sa-rsaWithSHA3-256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-256
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required
HASHES { mda-sha3-256 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa }
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY
id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-256 } }
sa-rsaWithSHA3-384 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-384
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required
HASHES { mda-sha3-384 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa }
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY
id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-384 } }
sa-rsaWithSHA3-512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-512
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required
HASHES { mda-sha3-512 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa }
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY
id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-512 } }
sa-ecdsaWithSHA3-224 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-sha3-224
VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
PARAMS ARE absent
HASHES { mda-sha3-224 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-sha3-224 } }
sa-ecdsaWithSHA3-256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-sha3-256
VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
PARAMS ARE absent
HASHES { mda-sha3-256 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-sha3-256 } }
sa-ecdsaWithSHA3-384 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-sha3-384
VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
PARAMS ARE absent
HASHES { mda-sha3-384 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-sha3-384 } }
sa-ecdsaWithSHA3-512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-sha3-512
VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
PARAMS ARE absent
HASHES { mda-sha3-512 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-sha3-512 } }
SignatureAlg ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM,
{ SignatureAlgs } }
SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
sa-rsaWithSHA3-224 |
sa-rsaWithSHA3-256 |
sa-rsaWithSHA3-384 |
sa-rsaWithSHA3-512 |
sa-ecdsaWithSHA3-224 |
sa-ecdsaWithSHA3-256 |
sa-ecdsaWithSHA3-384 |
sa-ecdsaWithSHA3-512,
... }
--
-- Message Authentication Codes
--
id-hmacWithSHA3-224 OID ::= { hashAlgs 13 }
id-hmacWithSHA3-256 OID ::= { hashAlgs 14 }
id-hmacWithSHA3-384 OID ::= { hashAlgs 15 }
id-hmacWithSHA3-512 OID ::= { hashAlgs 16 }
maca-hmacWithSHA3-224 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA3-224
PARAMS ARE absent
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA3-224 } }
maca-hmacWithSHA3-256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA3-256
PARAMS ARE absent
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA3-256 } }
maca-hmacWithSHA3-384 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA3-384
PARAMS ARE absent
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA3-384 } }
maca-hmacWithSHA3-512 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA3-512
PARAMS ARE absent
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA3-512 } }
MACAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ MAC-ALGORITHM,
{ MACAlgorithms } }
MACAlgorithms MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
maca-hmacWithSHA3-224 |
maca-hmacWithSHA3-256 |
maca-hmacWithSHA3-384 |
maca-hmacWithSHA3-512,
... }
--
-- Key Derivation Algorithms
--
id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-224 OID ::= { id-alg TBD1 32 }
id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-256 OID ::= { id-alg TBD2 33 }
id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-384 OID ::= { id-alg TBD3 34 }
id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-512 OID ::= { id-alg TBD4 35 }
id-kmac128 OID ::= { hashAlgs 21 }
id-kmac256 OID ::= { hashAlgs 22 }
id-kdf-kdf2 OID ::= { x9-44-components kdf2(1) }
id-kdf-kdf3 OID ::= { x9-44-components kdf3(2) }
kda-hkdf-with-sha3-224 KEY-DERIVATION ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-224
PARAMS ARE absent
-- No S/MIME caps defined -- }
kda-hkdf-with-sha3-256 KEY-DERIVATION ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-256
PARAMS ARE absent
-- No S/MIME caps defined -- }
kda-hkdf-with-sha3-384 KEY-DERIVATION ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-384
PARAMS ARE absent
-- No S/MIME caps defined -- }
kda-hkdf-with-sha3-512 KEY-DERIVATION ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-512
PARAMS ARE absent
-- No S/MIME caps defined -- }
kda-kmac128 KEY-DERIVATION ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-kmac128
PARAMS TYPE Customization ARE optional
-- PARAMS are absent when Customization is ''H --
-- No S/MIME caps defined -- }
kda-kmac256 KEY-DERIVATION ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-kmac256
PARAMS TYPE Customization ARE optional
-- PARAMS are absent when Customization is ''H --
-- No S/MIME caps defined -- }
kda-kdf2 KEY-DERIVATION ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-kdf-kdf2
PARAMS TYPE KDF2-HashFunction ARE required
-- No S/MIME caps defined -- }
kda-kdf3 KEY-DERIVATION ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-kdf-kdf3
PARAMS TYPE KDF3-HashFunction ARE required
-- No S/MIME caps defined -- }
Customization ::= OCTET STRING
KDF2-HashFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
{ KDF2-HashFunctions } }
KDF2-HashFunctions DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
X9-HashFunctions,
... }
KDF3-HashFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
{ KDF3-HashFunctions } }
KDF3-HashFunctions DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
X9-HashFunctions,
... }
X9-HashFunctions DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
mda-sha1 |
mda-sha224 |
mda-sha256 |
mda-sha384 |
mda-sha512 |
mda-sha3-224 |
mda-sha3-256 |
mda-sha3-384 |
mda-sha3-512,
... }
KeyDerivationFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ KEY-DERIVATION,
{ KeyDevAlgs } }
KeyDevAlgs KEY-DERIVATION ::= {
kda-hkdf-with-sha3-224 |
kda-hkdf-with-sha3-256 |
kda-hkdf-with-sha3-384 |
kda-hkdf-with-sha3-512 |
kda-kmac128 |
kda-kmac256 |
kda-kdf2 |
kda-kdf3,
... }
END
<CODE ENDS>
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Daniel Van Geest and Sean Turner for their careful review
and thoughtful comments.
Thanks to Sara Kerman, Quynh Dang, and David Cooper for getting the
object identifiers assigned for KMAC128 and KMAC256.
Author's Address
Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
Herndon, VA
United States of America
Email: housley@vigilsec.com